182 



SCIENCE 



l^. S. Vol. XXXI. No. 7S 



the German of to-day is, on the average, 

 gifted with more native inventiveness or 

 business ahility than his ancestors sixty 

 generations ago. The difference in the 

 arts and sciences does not mean that the 

 German of to-day is nati;rally more studi- 

 ous, or scientific, or musical. The more 

 settled condition of society does not imply 

 greater native capacity for industry or 

 government. The disappearance of old 

 superstitions does not imply that later gen- 

 erations were born without the tendencies 

 to superstition which characterized their 

 fathers. We are still not many generations 

 removed from witchcraft, curaes, magic 

 and the like savage beliefs and practises, 

 and we can not reasonably believe our 

 recent forefathers to have been naturally 

 more savage than we are. "When, for psy- 

 chological purposes, we compare the cul- 

 ture of Europe with that of Africa, we 

 should not leave out of account the Chil- 

 dren's Crusade, or the Inquisition, or the 

 Wars of the Roses. And if we attempt to 

 use the state of civilization as a measure of 

 racial intelligence, we must somehow adapt 

 the method so that it shall give the same 

 results, whether earlier or later stages in 

 the culture of a group be taken as the basis 

 for study. 



In reality, the civilization possessed by 

 a generation can not be used as a measure 

 of the intelligence of that generation any 

 more than an individual's property can be 

 taken as a measure of his business ability. 

 The gTcatest part of the civilization of a 

 generation is bequeathed to it, and only the 

 increase which it produces can be laid to its 

 credit. If we could compare the rate of 

 progress in different groups, this might 

 serve as a measure of intelligence ; and cer- 

 tainly some peoples are more progressive 

 than others. Before adopting such a test, 

 we should understand the mechanism of 



progress— a matter which belongs only in 

 part to psychology-. 



Progress depends first of all on human 

 inventiveness— so much will probably be 

 allowed. Under the head of inventions 

 should be included, not only mechanical 

 devices, but works of art and government, 

 business enterprises and changes in custom, 

 so far as any of these demand originality 

 in their producers. Science and all in- 

 crease in knowledge should also be in- 

 cluded, since the process of discovery dif- 

 fers but little from the process of invention. 

 In both the essential mental act seems to be 

 a bringing together of things that are 

 found apart, or a pulling apart of what 

 occurs together. In fact, both of these 

 processes, the combining or associating, and 

 the analytic or discriminating, go on to- 

 gether, since we see something new in a 

 thing when we are reminded by it of some- 

 thing else and different. There is a sug- 

 gestion of the accidental in all invention, 

 since it depends on "happening to notice 

 something, " or " happening to be reminded 

 of something. ' ' You can not be sure that 

 a person will make a discovery, even when 

 you supply him with the elements which 

 would combine to produce it. Oftentimes, 

 in reading the history of scientific progress, 

 one is surprised that a certain discovery 

 was not made by some man who had ap- 

 parently evei'ything before him to lead to 

 it. Invention is of the nature of a spon- 

 taneous variation, and this accidental char- 

 acter is very important in understanding 

 the mechanism of progress. 



On the other hand, since one can not be 

 reminded of things entirely unknown, in- 

 vention depends on previously acquired 

 knowledge, and the inventiveness of an 

 individual must take a direction prepared 

 for him by the social group among which 

 he lives. A large share of the inventive- 

 ness of the Australian natives seems to be 



