378 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. XIX. No. 479. 



failed to point this out, especially as it had 

 been pointed out by others, first in 1883 by 

 the writer of this review,* and subsequently 

 by Heinrich Waentig,! and also by his own 

 countryman, M. Alfred rouillee,J the passage 

 being- quoted in each ease. It will bear quot- 

 ing again. In the third volume of the ' Phi- 

 losophie Positive,' which appeared in 1838, 

 written, as he states in 1836, on page 392 he 

 says: 



If we conceive all possible organisms to be suc- 

 cessively placed, during a suitable time, in all 

 imaginable mediums, the greater part of these 

 organisms would of necessity finally disappear 

 and leave only those surviving which could satisfy 

 the general laws of this fundamental equilibrium; 

 it is probable that, after a succession of analogous 

 eliminations, the biological harmony must have 

 established itself little by little upon our planet, 

 where we still see it continually modifying itself 

 in a similar manner. 



A scarcely less remarkable passage occurs 

 in the fourth volume (p. 443), which appeared 

 in 1839. 



Levy-Bruhl's treatment of Comte's psychol- 

 ogy is much more satisfactory. It may seem 

 strange that he should devote a chapter to 

 psychology, when Comte expressly repudiated 

 the word. But he gives a simple explanation 

 of all this. In Comte's day psychology meant 

 ' the science of the soul reached through the 

 introspective method.' ' It was the science 

 founded by Cousin on the analysis of the ego,' 

 as taught by the eclectic school of philosophers. 

 " Comte, who opposes these philosophers, did 

 not wish his theory of psychical phenomena, 

 which differed from theirs, to be called by the 

 same name." He said in 1828 : " Some men, 

 not recognizing the present and irrevocable 

 direction of the human mind, have endeavored 

 for ten years to transplant German metaphys- 

 ics into our midst, and to constitute, under the 

 name of psychology, a so-called science en- 

 tirely independent of physiology." Comte re- 

 fused to regard psychic phenomena as distinct 



*' Dynamic Sociology,' Vol. I., p. 119. 



t ' Auguste Comte und seine Bedeutung filr die 

 Entwieklung der Socialwissenschaft,' Leipzig, 

 1894, p. 120. 



t ' Le Mouvement Positiviste et la Conception 

 Sociologique du Monde,' Paris, 1896, p. 101. 



from those of physiology, and, therefore, he 

 included their study in biology, although he 

 spoke of them as dealing with ' transcendental 

 functions.' In fact, Comte thought that there 

 might be a true science of phrenology, and 

 tried to found that science, although, even in 

 his day, as he himself knew and deplored, the 

 process of prostituting that term had already 

 begun, and soon after his death this had gone 

 so far that the word, notwithstanding its per- 

 fect etymology and appropriateness, was 

 wholly abandoned by scientific men, and the 

 term psychology was resuscitated and adopted 

 for the same science. But it is absurd to ac- 

 cuse Comte, as has been done, of lending any 

 countenance to the vagaries of phrenology. 



M. Levy-Bruhl brings into clear relief the 

 importance of sociology as a necessary part 

 of Comte's scheme. When we remember that 

 down to the year 1839 he had always called 

 this science ' social physics,' first using this 

 term in 1822, we can see very clearly what 

 was in his mind. With him the characteristic 

 of a true science was that its phenomena 

 should conform to invariable laws. This he 

 believed social phenomena to do. The name 

 social physics was chosen to emphasize this 

 view. It completed the series and supplied the 

 final term that had always been lacking. ' We 

 possess now,' he said, still at that early date, 

 ' a celestial physics, a terrestrial physics, either 

 mechanical or chemical, a vegetal physics 

 and an animal physics ; we still want one other 

 and last one, social physics, in order that the 

 system of knowledge of nature be complete.' 

 But he went farther and divided up the 

 science on strict mechanical lines, founding 

 both social statics and social dynamics. It 

 would unduly extend this review to attempt 

 to show how these two sciences were consti- 

 tuted, and the reader is referred to Levy- 

 Bruhl's fairly satisfactory presentation of the 

 subject. But any mention of Comte's name 

 almost requires the coupling of it with some 

 reference to his celebrated law of the three 

 stages (trois Stats) in the historical develop- 

 ment of human thought, which constitutes the 

 basis of his social dynamics. The attempt to 

 maintain that this law was discovered and an- 

 nounced by Turgot, Condorcet, Burdin and 



