April 6, 1906.] 



SCIENCE. 



539 



vention of any development in the board of 

 an influence in such matters whicli might 

 unneeessai-ily disturb the relations of the 

 members of the board to their colleagues or 

 to the president or trustees. 



On the other hand in matters of univer- 

 sity policy in general the board is privi- 

 leged to make such recommendations to 

 the president as it may decide to be ex- 

 pedient. To further the full and free dis- 

 cussion of all matters which may come be- 

 fore the board, and to assure independence 

 of judgment, it is provided that while the 

 president of the university shall have free 

 access to the board for purposes of infor- 

 mation and consultation, he shall not be a 

 member of it, and all conclusions of the 

 board are discussed and formulated in 

 executive session. 



Decisions of the advisory board are com- 

 municated directly to the president and to 

 no other university authority, and the 

 president communicates them to the trus- 

 tees in connection with his official recom- 

 mendations. The trustees may at their 

 discretion take cognizance of any differ- 

 ences of opinion between the president and 

 advisory board thus brought to their at- 

 tention. 



It will readily be understood that such a 

 board will exert a powerful conservative 

 influence upon the executive from the fac- 

 ulty standpoint. It would be difficult for 

 any serious differences to exist between 

 president and faculty without the trustees 

 having the issues thoroughly presented. 

 As a conservative check the influence of 

 such a board is doubtless more thoroughly 

 effective than that of a committee of trus- 

 tees, because the board is composed of 

 members more nearly expert on university 

 administration and local conditions than 

 are the trustees usually. It has been ob- 

 jected that a board composed of members 

 who hold their positions in the university 

 at the will of the president will not exer- 



cise independent judgment, but this con- 

 sideration will hardly have weight with 

 those conversant with the character and 

 temper of university faculties. On the 

 contrary, there is much more danger that 

 such a board with its constant sense of 

 responsibility as representative of the fac- 

 ulty, will tend to be ultra-conservative in 

 the matter of such changes in the faculty as 

 may be needed in the interests of the effect- 

 iveness of university work. 



"While thus necessarily acting to a cei'tain 

 extent as a conservative restraint upon the 

 president and indirectly at times upon the 

 trustees, on the other hand the duty im- 

 posed upon the board to act as confidential 

 adviser to the president, affords a natural 

 and established channel for the president 

 to keep in toiicli with representative faculty 

 sentiment and to secure more carefully con- 

 sidered and responsible advice on certain 

 classes of questions than is otherwise easily 

 obtained. 



The efficiency of the influence on the ad- 

 ministration of such a board will in the 

 long run depend upon the attitude of the 

 trustees and of the faculty towards its func- 

 tions. If the trustees systematically con- 

 sider the decisions of the board in connec- 

 tion with the nominations or recommenda- 

 tions of the president, they will have addi- 

 tional assurance of the wisdom of the acts 

 they are called upon to enact. If they sys- 

 tematically ignore the action of the board, 

 its functions will soon become perfunctory 

 or obsolete. 



If the faculty systematically elect the 

 members of the board with reference only 

 to their judgment and discretion in the 

 often difficult and delicate matters en- 

 trusted to their consideration, the influence 

 of the faculty upon administration will be 

 steadily strengthened. If, on the other 

 hand, other less relevant considerations 

 should enter into these elections, the influ- 

 ence of the board might easily be seriously 



