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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXV. No. 631 



Bciousness traced in eacii case along with the 

 objects through a series of modes : (1) The 

 controlling conditions of the determination 

 (that is, the control of the object) ; (2) the 

 motive to each of the determinations (the 

 problem of interest as ' practical,' or ' theo- 

 retical,' or other) ; (3) the function involved 

 in each determination; (4) the meaning of 

 the object over and above its actual objective 

 marks' (p. 30 f.). On page 34 seven sorts of 

 objects are distinguished and defined as fol- 

 lows. (1) The projective object of sense, (2) 

 the image object (of memory and fancy), (3) 

 the make-believe object ('the first determina- 

 tion of the semblant object'), (4) the sub- 

 stantive object (either mind or body), (5) 

 object of experience (object to a subject), (6) 

 judged or logical object (an object of experi- 

 ence which the psychic subject as such is 

 aware that it is in some sense acknowledging 

 or controlling), (7) the esthetic object (of 

 higher semblance in which the dualism of 

 inner and outer controls is annulled in a state 

 of immediate contemplation). Corresponding 

 to these are seven modes, namely, sense, 

 image, play, substantive, subject, logical, 

 aesthetic (p. 32). 



A criticism suggests itself here. This is a 

 work on the knower's logic, but the first four 

 ' objects ' in this list are not objects to the 

 knower. They are objects only to the psycho- 

 logical observer who analyzes. They are (to 

 use words which the author uses to char- 

 acterize a different subject) ' abstract mean- 

 ings of our reflection, that is meanings only 

 to a consciousness that can have an object 

 that means this.' This suggests another 

 fundamental objection, namely, to the author's 

 treatment of mere presence in consciousness 

 as knowledge, ' projective cognition.' This 

 treatment leads to setting up a ' subject,' or 

 a ' consciousness,' or etc., as the other term of 

 the cognitive relation, and gives us an episte- 

 mological dualism for which there is no solu- 

 tion. 



This epistemological dualism runs through 

 the entire book and is especially evident in 

 ■Chapter III., on How Knowledge is Made. 

 Here a system of 'grasping' and 'habitual 

 (dispositional processes ' is set over against an 



extra-psychic stimulus which, in some cases, 

 ' is not content with knocking down our forti- 

 fications,' but ' rides full-armed through our 

 walls, and compels its recognition in certain 

 of its characters for what it is' (p. 50, foot- 

 note) . This ' outside world ' whose impacts 

 (p. 54) are represented in consciousness by 

 the ' sense residuum or datum ' is as much a 

 thing-in-itself as Locke's outside world or the 

 explanation of our modifications of sensibility 

 in Kant's epistemology. If the author means 

 that this dualism of controls is merely psycho- 

 logical, the uncritical dualism of naive con- 

 sciousness and one which he does not regard 

 as real or valid, we should say it is a need- 

 lessly artificial way of describing the content 

 of consciousness, and also that it is misleading 

 to cite and criticize in this connection an 

 epistemological doctrine of control such as 

 that of Dewey. 



In Chapters VII., VIII. and IX., on Mean- 

 ing, the limiting and negative sense datum is 

 defined as a ' meaning,' and on page 172, 

 ' meanings arise as variations which presented 

 complexes take on for the satisfaction of vary- 

 ing dispositions.' But how is this to be recon- 

 ciled with the doctrine of a ' foreign ' sense- 

 datum, and with the general doctrine of ' outer 

 control ' 1 At the conclusion of the book the 

 author claims to have found that there is no 

 sort of discontinuity or dualism between pre- 

 logical function and thought, and that the 

 positive dualism is one within the operation 

 of the developing function of cognition, the 

 dualism of meanings (p. 272). A consumma- 

 tion devoutly to be wished at the present, but 

 what shall be said of the foreign warrior who 

 ' rides full-armed through our walls ' ? 



In a foot-note on page 50 the author seems 

 to ascribe to Dewey an epistemological dual- 

 ism of which we understand the latter to be 

 the sworn enemy. We may be in error as to 

 the teachings of both men, but so far as they 

 discuss the same aspects of the subject at all 

 we find many points of similarity between the 

 author's doctrine of control (and also his out- 

 lined experimental logic) and the teachings 

 of Dewey. The latter holds that to the knower 

 control always means objectivity, while Bald- 



