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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXII. No. 812 



other words, community as a fundamental 

 characteristic like quality, quantity, modality 

 and relation. It also involves continual refer- 

 ence to the external control of the things, or 

 spheres of things, that go to make up the 

 knower's world. These constitute the great 

 dualism of inner and outer controls which, 

 according to Baldwin, is for the knower char- 

 acteristic of the logical mode of cognition as 

 distinct from the pre-logical and the super- 

 logical modes. 



New distinctions and problems inevitably 

 give rise to a terminology sometimes strange. 

 The reader of the book has difficulties to over- 

 come, and not all of these are due to novel 

 terms. An unusual number of faulty gram- 

 matical constructions and typographical er- 

 rors, suggesting hasty writing and inadequate 

 proof-reading, make one pause and ponder. 



" The logical operations as such, considered 

 as the essential method of progress or advance 

 in the mode of thought, proceed by experi- 

 mentation, or . . . schematism" (p. 4). But 

 while schematism and experimentation are the 

 essential method of advance in thought, judg- 

 ment proper does not appear until they have 

 been passed. Like Mill, Baldwin limits log- 

 ical thought and judgment proper to the 

 sphere of relations of implication. Judgment 

 is the finished embodiment of belief. On the 

 last page of the book the singular, the subject 

 and the schematic are mentioned as extra- 

 logical (p. 418). The general, the concrete 

 and the logical are all retrospective, while 

 schematism is always prospective. Contents 

 are retrospective, intent and control are pro- 

 spective. 



Certain further fundamentals of the book 

 may be grouped as follows : Two sorts of 

 schematism, the recognitive or scientific and 

 the selective or appreciative, are distinguished. 

 Both are purposive, but the former alone must 

 agree with facts and satisfy the theoretical or 

 knowing interest. The latter is subject only 

 to inner control, that is, the laws of" reflection. 

 Four kinds of interest are distinguished, 

 namely, the " practical," the " pragmatic " 

 (the practical interest considered from the 

 outside or psychological point of view), the 

 " theoretic " and the " pragmatelic " (interest 



in the system of knowledge as satisfying, ful- 

 filling, consequential, etc.). The two types of 

 schematism are named, in the pre-logical 

 mode, presumption and lower assumption, and 

 in the logical mode, presupposition and higher 

 assumption. A child presumes the existence 

 of a toy for which it cries; it assumes a con- 

 trol when it tries to " feed " its doll. We pre- 

 suppose the law of conservation in physics: 

 we assume a control in the " illusion of the 

 theater." This is an adaptation of Meinong's 

 distinction between Annahme and Voraus- 

 setzung. 



The subject matter of judgment, here as 

 with Brentano, is a single whole which usu- 

 ally presupposes a sphere of control within 

 which the truth of the judgment falls. " Adam 

 Bede was a noble fellow," presupposes a sphere 

 called fiction, for example. The existential 

 judgment merely makes the presupposed con- 

 trol predicative (but not attributal) . In ordi- 

 nary judgment there is a relational content 

 under presuppositions : in the existential, the 

 presupposition is asserted (or denied). Bald- 

 win rejects Bradley's view that reality is the 

 ultimate subject of logical judgment, " for 

 reality is predicate, not subject " (p. 16, note 

 3). Then follows the distinction between 

 reality-feeling and belief first presented in the 

 author's " Handbook of Psychology." The 

 former is a consciousness of intent rather than 

 content; it is a reference to some presupposed 

 field of control when no lack, doubt, disturb- 

 ance or embarrassment exists as to the content 

 present in reflection. Belief arises only after 

 such disturbance has been resolved by judg- 

 ment into positive assertion or denial. Belief 

 embodies intent as well as content and its. 

 intent is presupposition. The latter has be- 

 come so conventional in aU social intercourse 

 that the intent of belief is seldom stirred up 

 (p. 23). "Belief is the disposition to judge 

 or acknowledge a thing as in some sense exist- 

 ing or real." 



Limitations of space preclude any attempt 

 to reproduce the argument of the book here. 

 The first chapter is the introduction, devoted 

 to the nature and presuppositions of experi- 

 mental logic. Chapter two classifies and dis- 

 cusses judgments or logical meanings accord- 



