OOTOBEB 14, 1910] 



SCIENCE 



491 



tates to enter, we still feel the influence of 

 his scientific predilections in the emphasis 

 he gave to a "radical empiricism," and in 

 his vigorous attacks upon the monistic phi- 

 losophers whom he accused of blinding 

 themselves to the vast variety within ex- 

 perience in their efforts to find unity in 

 what he believed to be really a ' ' pluralistic 

 universe. ' ' 



In this philosophical field his work was 

 on the whole less constructive than critical. 

 But his criticism was so cogent, and was 

 driven home with so much power, that even 

 those who were altogether out of sympathy 

 with his general philosophical position were 

 compelled to listen with attention and re- 

 spect. 



His name has of late come to be insepar- 

 ably connected with the philosophical tenet 

 known as pragmatism. Although it is true 

 that the first formulation of this doctrine 

 was due to Charles Peirce, as James him- 

 self took every opportunity to explain ; and 

 equally true that its acceptance has been 

 implicit in the writings of many of our 

 philosophical fathers, as James also ac- 

 knowledged in calling it "a new name for 

 some old ways of thinking": nevertheless, 

 it must be acknowledged that it is due 

 mainly to his brilliant expositions, that the 

 importance of the doctrine has become so 

 evident that it can never again be over- 

 looked as it has been in the past. 



The full significance of this doctrine can 

 not yet be fairly estimated. James himself 

 was ready to acknowledge this; and his 

 latest book "The Meaning of Truth" con- 

 tains many indications that, as his thought 

 developed, he was gaining new light in re- 

 gard to the implications of the postulate. 

 Whatever it may in the end have to say of 

 "the eternal verities," it at least teaches 

 us that we accept a conception as true just 

 so long as it is "workable"; that our con- 

 ceptions of truth are i-elative to the uses 



to which these conceptions are put; a fact 

 which surely implies that doubt indicates 

 no more than our discovery that these con- 

 ceptions are not thoroughly "workable," 

 and that modifications of them which shall 

 be closer to reality are required if they are 

 to maintain their full value in our lives. 



This teaching, if once firmly grasped, is 

 seen to have bearings that reach quite be- 

 yond the realm of theoretical metaphysics, 

 having special importance in the field of 

 concrete ethics; and I am convinced that, 

 had his life been spared, James would 

 surely have laid stress upon the ethical 

 implications of the doctrine he so persist- 

 ently pressed upon us. For no one could 

 come to know James even casually without 

 feeling that he was in the presence of a 

 man of unusual moral force. In fact, no 

 one can read far in his pages without gain- 

 ing this same impression, which was espe- 

 cially exemplified in such books as his 

 ' ' Will to Believe and other Essays on Pop- 

 ular Philosophy," and his "Talks to 

 Teachers on Psychology and to Students 

 on Some of Life's Ideals." He never 

 posed as an ethical teacher, to be sure, nor 

 was he given to sermonizing; yet his read- 

 ers were uplifted as they breathed, as it 

 were, the moral atmosphere in which his 

 thought moved. 



It is not surprising then that a man of 

 this nature should have taken a very deep 

 interest in the phenomena of religious life, 

 which yielded that remarkable series of 

 Gifford lectures later published under the 

 title of "Varieties of Religious Experi- 

 ence. ' ' Had James written no other work, 

 his life would have been a notably efiScient 

 one. In this book he gathered together the 

 results of the investigations of others, and 

 of his own keen observations; and placed 

 these results before his readers in a form 

 so persuasive, and withal so reverent, that 

 while, on the one hand, he aroused no hos- 



