JAITOABT 27, 1911] 



SCIENCE 



121 



ments are minor events. Until it is clearly 

 realized that the gravest crime of the 

 French revolution was not the execution 

 of the king, but the execution of Lavoisier, 

 there is no right measure of values, for 

 Lavoisier was one of the three or four 

 greatest men France has produced. 



Since pure science has been preeminent 

 in the past not only in furnishing useful 

 knowledge, but also as a chief foundation 

 of human progress, and is likely to long 

 continue equally preeminent, it is well 

 worth while to study the general principles 

 by which original research is guided. No 

 previous definite study of these principles 

 is known to me, although I have searched 

 not a little to find one. All that I have 

 been able to discover are treatises on logic, 

 the reading of which, most active investi- 

 gators would, I fear, find tedious and un- 

 profitable rather than helpful and in- 

 spiring. We have too many real difficul- 

 ties to quite enjoy wading through the 

 artificial morass of pedantries, in which 

 logicians by profession embed their signifi- 

 cant truths. The stricture is severe, but 

 not too severe even for so sound and val- 

 uable a work as Jevons's "Principles of 

 Science." It must be doubted very seri- 

 ously whether the study of logic is really 

 essential for the right training of an in- 

 vestigator. While it goes without saying 

 that logical thinking is indispensable in 

 science, neither may it be overlooked that 

 thinking is a complicated physiological 

 function, which is brought to efficiency by 

 practise, and that training by actual use 

 is the one indispensable means of dis- 

 ciplining and developing the function. 

 Playing the violin is a complicated physi- 

 ological function, but it is not thought 

 necessary that the violinist should study 

 the anatomy of the muscles and nerves of 

 the hand and arm. He perfects himself 

 by practise. Anatomical knowledge might 



enable him to understand why he can make 

 certain motions and can not make others. 

 Our analogy limps perhaps, but is a real 

 analogy, for practise in right thinking 

 creates the necessary habit of being logical, 

 and ability to describe the mental processes 

 in the language of logicians is an accom- 

 plishment which few even of the greater 

 scientific discoverers possess. 



It is my belief that the logical work of 

 scientific men is usually well done, and is 

 the part of their work which is least faulty. 

 The difficulties and the majority of fail- 

 ures are due, it seems to me, to two chief 

 causes, the first inadequate determination 

 of the premises, the second exaggerated 

 confidence in the conclusions. If I am 

 right, the method of science is the result 

 of the effort to get rid of these two causes 

 of error. 



We must recognize in starting that the 

 expression "the method of science" means 

 more than "logic," being far more compre- 

 hensive when rightly defined. We can not 

 alter the fundamental conditions of knowl- 

 edge, for we are still unable to add new 

 senses or improve the brain — although 

 eugenics dreams of a future with such pos- 

 sibilities — nor can we change the nature of 

 the phenomena. The same fundamental 

 resources are available for daily life and 

 for science. We must be clear in our 

 minds on this point, in order to compre- 

 hend that the fundamental distinction of 

 the scientific method is its accuracy. As I 

 have said on another occasion "there is 

 nothing to distinguish the scientific method 

 from the methods of every-day life except 

 its precision. It is not a difference in 

 kind or quality, but a quantitative differ- 

 ence, which marks the work of the true 

 scientist and gives its validity. ' ' Such be- 

 ing the case, a broad examination of the 

 method of science reduces itself to the 



