438 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXIII. No. 847 



tiling not really belonging to the natural 

 order, either e:splieit or implicit, is present 

 in li%-ing things. The essence of the con- 

 ception, whatever be its varietj' or form of 

 statement, is that something absolutel}' new 

 and novel came into the world when living 

 beings came, and that this came as a spe- 

 cial force, or principle, or factor — anj^- 

 thing you have a mind to call it, so long 

 as it is not material. A further essential 

 to the conception is that this new thing is 

 elemental, protean, onee-for-all. It is not 

 exactly the life itself of the organism. It 

 is rather the informing, underpinning, 

 ultimate motor, of life. 



So far as a general discussion like this is 

 concerned, there is no advantage in taking 

 cognizance of a neo- or rejuvenated vital- 

 ism, beyond noting that the efforts in con- 

 fomiitj' with the modem demand for rigor- 

 ous analysis is to limit, or locate this extra 

 somewhat more definitely in, or among, the 

 material substrata of organisms. 



So much for definitions. I said a mo- 

 ment ago that the historical aspect of the 

 subject must not be wholly ignored. All, 

 however, that seems incumbent upon us in 

 this quarter is to remind ourselves that the 

 term materialism has cut a considerable 

 figure in the philosophies of the schools, 

 while the term "vitalism" has not. Fur- 

 ther, to most traditional and vocational 

 philosophers materialism as defined is a 

 very naive, almost childish conception: 

 while its adversary, vitalism, has little or 

 no standing among philosophers. Its es- 

 sential interests are abundantly cared for 

 by professionals under other captions. 

 The significant thing for us in this treat- 

 ment of materialism and vitalism by philos- 

 ophy is the evidence it affords that neither 

 materialism nor vitalism stand up weU as 

 philosophical conceptions, under the fire of 

 rigorous logical analysis and a highly de- 

 veloped dialectic. This circumstance can 



not go unheeded by any careful biologist, 

 for whatever may be his estimate of the 

 worth of metaphysical sj'stems, he can not 

 fail to recognize that every trained meta- 

 physician carries a blade of analysis, and 

 of offense and defense in intellectual en- 

 counter, that may well elicit the admira- 

 tion and be the dismay of any ordinary 

 man of science. 



Now this slighting by formal philosophy 

 of conceptions that biology makes much of 

 when it attempts to be philosophic, ought 

 to cause biologists to wonder if perchance 

 their philosophizing is less happy, less 

 trustworthy, than their achievements in 

 science proper. This leads to where I may 

 give my categorical answer to the question 

 taken as the subject of the paper: The con- 

 troversy between materialism and vitalism 

 would end forthwith could both concep- 

 tions be recognized as only mile-stones 

 along the road of progress ; could they both 

 be seen to contain truly living substance 

 eneapsuled by dead matter which must be 

 left behind as crumpled exuviae when the 

 next stage of advance is entered upon. 

 The controversy will not cease but will con- 

 tinue with increasing unfruitfulness so 

 long as either side holds the truth it sees as 

 absolute and all-sufficing. 



To bring the real inwardness of the case 

 home with force I am going to state it in a 

 way that will at first seem extreme and 

 harsh: Materialism is a lineal descendant 

 in rational process of the basis of magic of 

 certain ancestois of ours who, though far 

 cruder than we are, were no less earnest of 

 desire and of effort to understand nature 

 and get on well with her. Vitalism is sim- 

 ilarly descended from the animism of still 

 other ancestors, probably somewhat more 

 recent and less crude, but no less earnest 

 and sturdy than those with whom magie 

 reigned. 



This theory of the origin of materialism 



