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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXIII. No. 855 



They will say that philosophy has at last 

 discovered that neither its problems nor its 

 methods are so fundamentally different from 

 those of science as was once supposed; that 

 there is now a great philosophical movement, 

 with an evolutionary logic — the conception 

 of the working hypothesis — as its avowed 

 method; and that it is therefore now possible 

 for a scientist to stroll into the field of philos- 

 ophy and set to work with his own tools. And 

 indeed the spirit of this philosophical move- 

 ment variously known as "pragmatism," "evo- 

 lutionism " and " experimentalism," is cer- 

 tainly very different from the Hegelian ideal- 

 ism, which found the difference between 

 philosophy and science to consist in the fact 

 that the doctrines of the former are " neces- 

 sary," while those of science are merely "hypo- 

 thetical." 



Still, in such a rapprochement as is taking 

 place between philosophy and science it would 

 be strange if all the change were on one side. 

 For one thing, it seems obvious that the sur- 

 render of absolutistic methods by philosophy 

 means added responsibilities for scientific 

 method. Under the old regime science, even 

 while renouncing and denouncing philosophy 

 and all its works, found comfort in turning 

 over to philosophy certain ethical and social 

 questions which it found difficult to handle or 

 which interfered with the pursuit of " purely 

 scientific truth." 



Much of the doctrine of this book (whose 

 title, by the way, means that the only truth 

 that is stable is that truth is not stable) is to 

 the effect that if important human interests 

 formerly turned over to transcendental meth- 

 ods are now thrown back upon scientific 

 method, this method must be human enough 

 to take care of them. And this means that 

 scientific method and interest can not be 

 purely intelleetualistic. The author says: 



The purpose of this book is to set forth the 

 doctrine that the final test of truth is found in 

 trusting our lives to it. . . . The primal impulse, 

 as well as the final purpose of science is the con- 

 duct of life. . . . Pure science can not be separated 

 from applied science. . . . Knowledge is power; 

 power is evidence that our belief is knowledge. 



These and other similar statements on 

 almost any page warrant the reader in say- 

 ing that the book points at the hyper-intel- 

 lectualism of science no less than at that of 

 philosophy. 



From the specific doctrines of the book the 

 following points have been specially noted: 

 (1) The recognition, rather unusual in a nat- 

 ural scientist, of the social character of con- 

 sciousness and the self. " I think, therefore 

 I am, gives place to we think, therefore we 

 are." (2) Mr. Balfour's philosophic doubt is 

 well hit off as " a process by which men ques- 

 tion the only things they know to be true in 

 order to prove the reality of things they know 

 not to be true." This applies to all " tran- 

 scendental doubt." (3) The " recrudescence 

 of superstition," which accompanies an age of 

 science, " is made possible by the fact that the 

 traditions of science are so diffused in the 

 community at large that fools find it safe to 

 defy them." (4) Superstition and dogmatism 

 are shown to be identical in so far as both 

 ignore the process of experimentation. (5) 

 The chapter on Eeality and Monism, which is 

 one of the best, puts two questions to Haeckel's 

 monism: Is it a genuine scientific hypothesis, 

 that is, one capable of verification? Is it of 

 any ethical significance in the conduct of life ? 

 The author finds for the negative in both 

 cases. (6) In the last chapter on Eeality and 

 Tradition, the " warfare between science and 

 theology " is found to be quite as much a war- 

 fare between old and new science and to 

 exist in the individual mind of the scientist 

 and theologian alike. 



In view of the general insistence upon the 

 organic connection between science and the 

 conduct of life, some readers may find diffi- 

 culty with certain passages on " Belief," in 

 which belief is justified as a " philosophical " 

 category by " its effect on the conduct of life," 

 even though it " is not reducible to terms of 

 human experience" (pp. 42, 44). But "as 

 men of science," we can not accept any hy- 

 pothetic " articles of faith " not resting on 

 " scientific induction." " I ought not to say 

 I believe when I can not say I know " (p. 



