930 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXIII. No. 859 



icaF make-up give different physical results? 

 Shall he abandon the principle of " univocal 

 determination," not merely from a practical 

 experimental standpoint, but completely? 

 Or shall he follow Driesch's example and try 

 to save the principle by assuming that the two 

 cases differ in something non-physical (which 

 he may call entelechy if he likes the word) ? 

 Professor Lovejoy's suggestion that this latter 

 is a hypostasis hardly warranted in strictly 

 scientific procedure, would leave us absolutely 

 without determining cause for the difference; 

 the experimenter could but admit the failure 

 of the principle on which his work is based, 

 lay down his arms, and surrender. But does 

 Driesch's assumption of a non-physical dif- 

 ferentiation between the two cases leave the 

 experimenter in a better situation? 



Driesch's statement to save the principle of 

 •determinism in such a case is as follows: 

 " given certain circumstances, and given a 

 certain entelechy in a certain state of mani- 

 festation, there will always be or go on one 

 specifically determined event and no other." ' 

 Thus under the conditions we have sketched, 

 the investigator could comfort himself (if he 

 found it a comfort) with the assertion that 

 different entelechies were at work in the two 

 cases; or that the same entelechy was at work 

 in different manifestations (the latter formula 

 would be forced upon us by the vitalistic argu- 

 ments from behavior). Now, what is the dif- 

 ference between attributing experimental re- 

 sults to such non-physical determiners, and 

 "the ordinary experimental procedure of at- 

 tributing them to physical determiners? 



The difference lies in two points (which are 

 perhaps fundamentally one) : (1) Any phys- 

 ical factor has various manifestations, the 

 conditions for each of which are discoverable 

 and constant; it is bound up in many differ- 

 ent ways with the rest of the conditions. 

 Hence if the experimenter attributes a result 

 to a certain physical factor, this is at once 



* I am throughout using the word physical in 

 place of ' ' physical and chemical, " " physical or 

 chemical" and "physico-chemical." 



' ' ' The Science and Philosophy of the Organ- 

 ism," II., 153-154. 



open to test; we may try whether its other 

 manifestations appear as they should if it is 

 in presence; it leads at once to farther ex- 

 perimentation, and the explanation must stand 

 or fall in accordance with the results of this 

 experimentation. On the other hand, the 

 non-physical entelechy may give different 

 manifestations (or none at all) under the 

 same conditions ; there is no way that we can 

 test the affirmation that a given experimental 

 result is due to it. A physical factor that 

 showed itseK in one unique manifestation, 

 and might later show itself under the same 

 conditions in a different manifestation would 

 of course leave the experimenter as helpless as 

 does entelechy ; but such a " physical factor " 

 is a contradiction in terms; it is because 

 entelechy has this character that it is a non- 

 physical factor." Thus attribution of a result 

 to entelechy closes the door to farther experi- 

 mental test. 



2. In experimenting in non-vitalistic fields, 

 after we have discovered what preceding dif- 

 ferences determine (experimentally) our given 

 diversities, we may move a step back and dis- 

 cover in the same way what determined those 

 preceding differences; and this process of 

 carrying back the experimental analysis is 

 without end (save from practical difficulties). 

 On the other hand, as soon as the experi- 

 menter has attributed his observed diversities 

 of result to different manifestations of entele- 

 chy he is at the end of his experimental rope. 

 What determines, under the same physical con- 

 ditions, the different manifestations of entele- 

 chy ? The problem is not only practically, but 

 by hypothesis, beyond the reach of experi- 

 mentation." 



"If, as some have suggested, entelechy is to be 

 considered merely a name for a factor whose 

 dependence on the rest of the conditions and 

 whose vmiformity of action is not yet known, we 

 should of course by this assumption drop our 

 vitalistic theory; it is by vitalistic hypothesis that 

 entelechy has the peculiarities mentioned above. 



" ' ' Organic systems are governed by entelechy, 

 and therefore contain all possible future percept- 

 ible diversities in an imperceptible form," 

 Driesch, ' ' Science and Philosophy of the Organ- 

 ism," II., 198. 



