348 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XL. No. 1027 



The author's aim is to contribute to the ad- 

 vancement of epistemology. It is not, how- 

 ever, epistemology in the Hegelian sense. For 

 Enriques, epistemology has for its object "to 

 explain the process by which the most advanced 

 science is built up." It is, he says, "of the 

 first importance that epistemology should be 

 conceived as an actual positive science " ; a 

 science in the making, he, of course, means, 

 as is abundantly evident. In a word, epistem- 

 ology is to be conceived as the science of 

 knowledge, and no one knows better than our 

 author that to make a contribution to the sci- 

 ence of knowledge demands knowledge of 

 science. He would probably not deny that, as 

 Thomas He Quincy so well said, every prob- 

 lem of science ultimately roots in metaphysic. 

 But he is convinced that it is not therefore 

 necessary or profitable to be always burrowing 

 like a mole in the black soil where the roots are 

 hid. Bergson the book does not know, prob- 

 ably because the Frenchman's splendid star had 

 not yet risen when the book was written. 

 Doubtless he would agree with Bergson that 

 after the method of science has said all it can 

 of a given object there remains in it an un- 

 touched residuum — something of which it is 

 possible and desirable to gain that kind of 

 knowledge that one means when, for example, 

 one says of one's self : I know how to move my 

 arm. Perhaps the Italian would agree with 

 the Frenchman that there is thus indicated a 

 proper province and task for metaphysics, 

 namely, the province and task of winning that 

 residual kind of knowledge through a kind of 

 " intellectual sympathy " with the object, 

 through a kind of fellow feeling with it. But 

 the Italian's epistemology is a different sort. 

 It is " positive " epistemology. It has " a real 

 object to explain." This object is the upbuild- 

 ing of what we call scientific knowledge and 

 so it has " actual problems to solve." These 

 '•ought not to depend upon the inconstant 

 opinions of philosophers " nor " upon the so- 

 cial interests that determine these opinions." 

 Epistemology becomes "positive" only in so 

 far as it is established " independently of 

 metaphysics." For Enriques the supreme 



desideratum in this enterprise is "systema- 

 tically to banish whatever pertains to the 

 transcendental process of the reason." 



What is this dread process? It shows itself 

 in many guises, most commonly, perhaps al- 

 ways in last analysis, as a subtle assumption 

 that an infinite series has in some way a final 

 term, or, if not a final term, at all events 

 an actual limit. In this way all sorts of 

 absolutes, absolute motion, absolute sub- 

 stance, absolute time, absolute morality, and 

 so on, come to figure in our thinking. Such 

 absolutes may have emotional value and so 

 constitute " a problem for the psychologist " 

 but as concepts for scientific use they are 

 worse than worthless. We can not even show 

 that an infinite sequence has a limit by merely 

 showing that it neither diverges nor oscillates. 



One of the best sections of the introductory 

 chapter is that in which is dicussed the ques- 

 tion of " so-called insoluble problems." It is 

 contended that " in a broad sense there are no 

 insoluble problems." " There are only prob- 

 lems not yet suitably stated." Some one ought 

 to write a work on the history of curiosity. 

 Why have questions arisen in the order in 

 which they have arisen instead of some other 

 order among an infinite variety of thinkable 

 orders? Why have questions seemed to be 

 questions when they have really not been ques- 

 tions? Our author's thesis respecting insol- 

 uble problems is well illustrated by him in 

 connection with an admirable account of the 

 famous so-called problems of squaring the cir- 

 cle, perpetual motion and alchemy. This 

 chapter is mainly concerned, however, with the 

 distinction between subjective and objective 

 in scientific knowledge. It is argued that both 

 kinds of elements enter into all scientific 

 knowledge, but as such knowledge advances 

 the subjective component tends to disappear 

 and the objective comes to be more and more. 

 In fact, the two elements " are not two irre- 

 ducible terms of knowledge, but they are 

 rather two aspects " of it. The question is 

 considered in relation to measurement and to 

 scientific construction. This leads to a cri- 

 tique, of positivism in relation to metaphysics, 

 to physics, to biology, to psychology, to history 



