198 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLIII. No. 1102 



The problem confronting these theories is 

 to identify the causes underlying the ob- 

 served similarities of culture traits. 



It is clear that the theory of a single 

 origin for even the most widely distributed 

 traits assumes no necessity for the inher- 

 itance of particular ideas. The theory of 

 independent origin when invoked to explain 

 the occurrence of certain traits in large 

 distinct areas as in both the Old and New 

 "World, is also consistent with the unorig- 

 inal nature view ; but when pushed farther 

 and made to account for the separate ap- 

 pearance of a trait in many places, leads its 

 supporters into an embarrassing position. 

 When we assume a single place of origin 

 for a trait, we take the view that its ap- 

 pearance is accidental. Thus, original na- 

 ture offers no explanation for the event, 

 only a historical account of what tran- 

 spired in the place and time will suffice. 

 For example, some anthropologists are of 

 the opinion that the bow was invented but 

 once and thence found its way gradually 

 over the world by diifusion. (This seems 

 likely in view of the known history of fire- 

 arms.) In such cases, it appears that the 

 invention and its development in one place 

 is due to the chance combination of many 

 causes. Underlying it is an idea ■whose 

 occurrence in the mind of an individual 

 was truly accidental. I have elsewhere 

 referred to this view as the psychic accident 

 theory for culture origin. Now the diffi- 

 culty in extending the independent origin 

 theory to many small areas is that we have 

 too many accidents, unless one can show 

 that the possibilities are limited to a few 

 alternatives and that all men will be made 

 aware of the same kind of situation. How- 

 ever, few anthropologists take the extreme 

 view that all occurrences of the same trait 

 are due to independent invention, the gen- 

 eral tendency being, when a trait has a 

 continuous distribution over an area, to 



consider it as having been diffused from one 

 point or center included in, or contiguous 

 to, the area in which it is found. Thus, 

 that the bow may have been invented in two 

 or three parts of the world is conceivable 

 without doing violence to our experience 

 with chance phenomena; but, if we go on 

 and divide up the world into small units 

 we soon reach a point where we must find 

 other than accidental causes. The de- 

 fenders of the independent theory recog- 

 nize this, for practically all resort to the 

 assumed unity of the human mind to ac- 

 count for the frequency of widely distrib- 

 uted traits; but when they do so they put 

 themselves into a position where the denial 

 of direct dependence upon original nature 

 is next to the impossible. 



In general, if we take cognizance of psy- 

 chological knowledge, it appears that so 

 far all attempts to explain particular cul- 

 ture traits as due to the unity of the human 

 mind have been abortive. On the one 

 hand, ^we have no psychological evidence 

 that particular ideas are due to particular 

 psycho-physical biases — in fact there is 

 abundant evidence to the contrary — while 

 on the other, we have the obvious fact that 

 cultures do differ and that one of these 

 common culture traits when displaced soon 

 passes into oblivion or does not recur. For 

 example, how many of us would ever have 

 conceived a bow, if the thing were not 

 taught us ? Further, the unity of the mind 

 theory ignores the great unity of the phys- 

 ical world which certainly controls many 

 traits of culture. Thus, the problem of 

 cutting has but one ready solution, a mate- 

 rial harder than that to be cut and a knife 

 edge. This is due to the physical unity of 

 the world. Hence, whenever men happen 

 to solve this problem, their solutions tend 

 to similarity in the essentials of cutting 

 tools; but if the unity of man's mind pre- 

 determined the solution, why should we 



