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SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XLIII. No. 1109 



nouneements it is profanity to reject. One 

 hears in popular speech such expressions 

 as "science says . . ." or, "according to 

 science," or "science teaches" and this 

 indicates that in the mind of the average 

 man there is a more or less developed cult 

 of science as an infallible entity, personal- 

 ity, or divinity, which, like Minerva, has 

 no earthly or human origin. It is perhaps 

 not the popular mind that is wholly to 

 blame for this. When one reviews the dis- 

 cussions and polemics of the last fifty 

 years, which have arisen from the con- 

 flict between conservative and advanced 

 thought, and, especially, advanced thought 

 based on direct observation and experi- 

 ment, there has not been wanting a species 

 of dogmatism in not a few of the repre- 

 sentatives of science, that suggests the 

 claim of a degree of infallibility which the 

 popular mind, superficial as it is, and be- 

 cause of the achievements of science, has 

 been and is inclined to accept. It is true, 

 the clearest-minded amongst the repre- 

 sentatives of science never by speech or 

 silence encouraged such a claim. Tyndall, 

 Huxley, Kelvin, Helmholtz, Virchow and 

 Pasteur have, in set terms, again and again 

 insisted that science is not infallible. 

 Huxley, throughout his long crusade for 

 the recognition of science as a force mak- 

 ing for progress, was specially insistent on 

 the possibility of error in science. He it 

 was who defined science as nothing but 

 trained and organized common sense, a defi- 

 nition that ought to acquit it of the charge 

 of claiming infallibility. 



In spite of these disclaimers, the taint of 

 a reputation for infallibility remains, and 

 it not infrequently draws from the super- 

 ficial, as well as from some who ought to 

 know better, the criticism that the judg- 

 ments of science are unstable and ought 

 not to be regarded as having any validity 

 when they are opposed to the established 



beliefs and the dogma of the day. Some- 

 times the exponents of the older learning 

 denounce science as falsely so-called, or 

 term it pseudo-science. At one time that 

 was the stock charge against science, and 

 it had its effect on the unthinking. It still 

 is launched against science chiefly in the 

 polemical publications of the orthodox 

 theological school. 



It is, however, when the criticism comes 

 from the rank and file of the army of sci- 

 ence that it does the most mischief, and 

 especially so when it is urged in defence, 

 not of religious beliefs or dogmas of a phil- 

 osophical school, but of dogmas like vital- 

 ism, the acceptance of which postulates a 

 negation of the established methods of 

 science. 



It is not difficult, though not fair, to 

 charge science with pretensions to infalli- 

 bility, then to recall its mistakes, its dis- 

 carded theories and generalizations and 

 thereby to impugn its claims to speak with 

 authority on matters with which it busies 

 itself. That appeals occasionally to the 

 man in the street and it gains a little, per- 

 haps desired, notoriety for the critic, but 

 does it help us in the final cast of things to 

 question the hard-won achievements of the 

 human mind and say that they are naught ? 

 By what other methods than those followed 

 in scientific research can organized knowl- 

 edge be gained? Is it by intuition, revela- 

 tion or the dialectics and pipe-dreams of 

 the intellectualists 1 It is, therefore, beside 

 the mark for Von Uexkiill to ask ' ' Was ist 

 eine wissenschaftliche Wahrheit?" and to 

 answer ' ' Ein Irrtum von heute. " In a dif- 

 ferent spirit and with a world of differ- 

 ence in ultimate meaning is the observa- 

 tion of Huxley that ' ' history warns us that 

 it is the customary fate of new truths to 

 begin as heresies and to end as supersti- 

 tions. ' ' 



