October 8, 1915] 



SCIENCE 



485 



there were cogent reasons in the national 

 interest for the action taken. 



Direct government intervention in regard 

 to food supplies was limited to three com- 

 modities — sugar, meat and wheat. In the 

 case of sugar the whole business of supply 

 was taken over by the government — a huge 

 undertaking but administratively a com- 

 paratively simple one, owing to the fact that 

 there are no home-grown supplies. Inter- 

 vention in the meat trade was necessitated 

 by the fact that the enormous demands of 

 the allied armies had to be met by drafts 

 upon one particular kind of meat and 

 mainly from one particular source. The 

 board of trade cooperated with the war 

 office, and a scheme was evolved whereby 

 a very large part of the output of meat 

 from South America and Australia comes 

 under government control. 



As regards wheat, the intervention of the 

 government took two forms. The scheme 

 whereby the importation of wheat from 

 India was undertaken by the British gov- 

 ernment, in cooperation with the Indian 

 government, arose primarily from condi- 

 tions in India rather than from conditions 

 in the United Kingdom, although it is 

 hoped and believed that the results will 

 prove to be mutually advantageous. Other 

 than this the intervention of the govern- 

 ment in regard to wheat was devised as an 

 insurance against the risk of interruption 

 of normal supplies, its main object being to 

 prevent the stocks of wheat in the country 

 from falling to a dangerous level at a time 

 when the home crop would be practically 

 exhausted. When the home crop is just 

 harvested there are ample reserves in the 

 country for some months, and, as the United 

 States and Canada are at the same time 

 selling freely, stocks held by the trade are 

 usually high. While home-grown wheat 

 remains on the farms it is practically an 

 additional reserve supplementary to the 



commercial reserves. When it leaves the 

 farmers' hands, even although it may not 

 actually go into consumption, it becomes 

 part of the commercial reserve. This re- 

 serve in the nature of business tends to be 

 constant, but jfluctuates within rather wide 

 limits under the influence of market condi- 

 tions. If the price of wheat rises substan- 

 tially and the capital represented by a 

 given quantity increases, there is a natural 

 tendency to reduce stocks. If also there is 

 any indication of a falling market ahead, 

 whether from favorable crop prospects or 

 the release of supplies now held oif the 

 market for any reason, a prudent trader 

 reduces his stocks to the smallest quantity 

 on which he can keep his business running. 

 So long as shipments reach this country, as 

 in normal times they do, with, as a member 

 of the Baltic once expressed it to me, "the 

 I'egularity of buses running down Cheap- 

 side," the country may safely rely on re- 

 ceiving its daily bread automatically. But if 

 any interruption occurred at a time when 

 the trade, for the reasons just indicated, hap- 

 pened to be running on low stocks, the mar- 

 gin for contingencies might be insufScient. 

 I am, of course, debarred from discussing 

 the method adopted or the manner in which 

 the scheme was carried out, but, as the 

 cereal year for which it was devised is over, 

 it is permissible to state that the object in 

 view was successfully achieved. 



Of the 47,000,000 people who form the 

 population of the United Kingdom the 

 large majority are absolutely dependent 

 for their daily food on the organization and 

 regular distribution of supplies. The coun- 

 tryman, even if he possesses no more than 

 a pig and a garden, might exist for a short 

 time, but the town-dweller would speedily 

 starve if the organization of supplies broke 

 down. He does not, perhaps, sufficiently 

 realize the intricacy of the commercial ar- 

 rangements which make up that organiza- 



