806 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXIV. No. 884 



Eelated to this disregard of the psycholog- 

 ical problem is Mr. Graebner's claim, that no 

 objective criteria have been found that can 

 prove relations other than those due to his- 

 torical connection; that the evolutionary in- 

 vestigation can do no more than answer the 

 question : " How can I best and with the least 

 number of contradictions imagine the course 

 of human development in accordance with 

 my general, fundamental views?" (p. 82). 

 Against this method he claims that transfer 

 has been proved to exist everywhere, while 

 the presence of parallel development can not 

 be proved by objective criteria (p. 107). I 

 think, we must say, that certain types of 

 changes due to internal forces have been ob- 

 served everywhere, and that, therefore, the 

 question of similar or dissimilar evolution 

 through internal forces does not rest on a 

 more hypothetical basis than changes due to 

 transmission. 



Another fundamental difference of opinion 

 between Graebner and myself relates to the 

 phenomenon of " convergence," and here 

 again the conclusions reached by the author 

 seem to me due to a narrow, mechanical defi- 

 nition of the term " convergence." He as- 

 cribes this idea to Thilenius and Ehrenreich. 

 I may, perhaps, point out that I have raised 

 the essential point in an essay " The Limita- 

 tions of the Comparative Method of Anthro- 

 pology," ' and again in my essay " The Mind 

 of Primitive Man." ' Graebner's first error 

 in regard to this phenomenon is one which he 

 shares with almost all other students of 

 anthropogeography. I quote from p. 94: 

 " Gleichartige Erseheinungen konnen auch 

 durch Angleichung urspriinglich verschie- 

 dener Erseheinungen unter dem Einfluss 

 gleicher ITatur- oder Kulturumgebung zu- 

 stande kommen. Da eine spezifiseh gleiche 

 Kulturumgebung ausser durch Kulturver- 

 wandtschaft aber ihrerseits nur als durch 

 gleiche Naturumgebung hervorgerufen denk- 

 bar ist, bleibt diese allein als primare TJrsache 

 von Konvergenzen iibrig." This presupposes 



1 Science, N. S., Vol. IV., pp. 901-8, 1896. 



'Journal of American Folk-Lore, Vol. XIV., pp. 

 1-11, 1901. 



an existence of a mankind without any indi- 

 vidual differences, or an absolute identity of 

 the psychical conditions that are afitected by 

 geographical environment. As soon as the 

 psychic basis is distinct, even the most abso- 

 lute identity of environment can not be as- 

 sumed to lead to the same result. It is a 

 curious view that is so often held, that when 

 we speak of the infiuence of environment upon 

 the human mind, only the environment need 

 be considered. Is not in every problem of 

 interaction the character of each of the inter- 

 acting phenomena of equal importance? In 

 the particular case here discussed we may say 

 that our whole experience does not exhibit a 

 single case in which two distinct tribal groups 

 are so much alike in their mental character- 

 istics that, when they are subjected to the 

 same modifying causes, these mental differ- 

 ences could be disregarded, and it is an en- 

 tirely hypothetical and improbable assumption 

 that in earlier periods absolute mental uni- 

 formity ever existed in distinct groups. 



The idea that in cases of independent origin 

 of the same cultural phenomena identity of 

 environment can give the only satisfactory 

 explanation is deeply rooted in Mr. Graebner's 

 mind, for he repeats, on p. 112 : " Gleiche 

 Kulturbedingungen bei selbstandiger Entsteh- 

 ung konnen ihrerseits wieder nur auf die 

 Naturbedingungen zuriickgehen." 



The phenomenon of convergence is next 

 considered as non-existent for two reasons : a 

 theoretical one and an empirical one. The 

 former is based on the consideration that con- 

 vergence can occur only under identical cul- 

 tural conditions, and that, therefore, hetero- 

 geneous cultural conditions such as are found 

 in cultures not genetically related, can not 

 possibly lead to the same result. The empir- 

 ical argument is based on a consideration of 

 conditions found in Europe (pp. 113-114). A 

 consideration of the same data leads me to re- 

 sults diametrically opposed to those observed 

 by Graebner. The very fact that in modern 

 civilization a new idea is frequently discov- 

 ered independently by several individuals 

 seems to me a proof of parallel lines of 

 thought; and Mr. Graebner's statement that 



