.December 8, 1911] 



SCIENCE' 



807 



the thought of only one man becomes socially 

 active, i. e., is adopted, seems to me to demon- 

 strate just the reverse from what he claims. 

 For an idea expressed at a time that is not 

 ready for it remains barren of results; pro- 

 nounced at a period when many think on 

 similar, convergent lines, it is fruitful and 

 may revolutionize human thought. May I 

 point out that Graebner's own book may be 

 taken as an example of this tendency? For 

 it expresses the same fundamental idea that 

 is so potent at present in all lines of biological 

 research, that of the permanence of unit char- 

 acters. An idea may become effective when- 

 ever the ethnic conditions are favorable to its 

 adoption and development, no matter what the 

 historical origin of the present general status 

 may have been. 



. The questions of independent origin and 

 convergence can not be entirely separated, and 

 some of the previous remarks may perhaps 

 rather relate to the probability of independ- 

 ent origin which Graebner practically denies. 

 One aspect of the theory of convergence relates 

 more specifically to the question whether two 

 ethnic groups that are genetically distinct, 

 which are confronted by the same problem, 

 will solve it in a similar manner. The theory 

 of convergence claims that similar ways may 

 (not must) be found. This would be a truism, 

 if there existed only one way of solving this 

 problem, and convergence is obviously the 

 more probable the fewer the possible solutions 

 of the problem. This, however, is not what 

 we ordinarily understand under convergence. 

 Ethnic phenomena are, on the whole, exceed- 

 ingly complex, and apparently similar ones 

 may embrace quite distinct complexes of ideas 

 and may be due to distinct causes. To take a 

 definite example: Taboos may be arbitrarily 

 forbidden actions; they may be actions that 

 are not performed because they are not cus- 

 tomary, or those that are not performed be- 

 cause associated with religious or other con- 

 cepts. Thus a trail may be forbidden because 

 the owner does not allow trespassing, or it 

 may have a sacred character, or it may be 

 feared. All ethnic units, separated from their 

 cultural setting, are artificial units, and we 



always omit in our comparisons certain 

 groups of distinctive characteristics — no mat- 

 ter whether the comparisons are made from 

 the point of view of cultural transmission, or 

 of evolutionary series. Thus, in our case, the 

 forbidden action stands out clearly as a unit, 

 that of the taboo, although its psychological 

 sources are entirely distinct — and this is 

 one of the essential features of convergence. 

 Nobody claims that convergence means an 

 absolute identity of phenomena derived from 

 heterogeneous sources; but we think we 

 have ample proof to show that the most 

 diverse ethnic phenomena, when subject to 

 similar psychical conditions, or when refer- 

 ring to similar activities, will give similar 

 results (not equal results), which we group 

 naturally under the same category when 

 viewed not from a historical standpoint, but 

 from that of psychology, technology or other 

 similar standpoints. The problem of con- 

 vergence lies in the correct interpretation of 

 the significance of ethnic phenomena that are 

 apparently identical, but in many respects 

 distinct; and also in the tendency of distinct 

 phenomena to become psychologically similar, 

 due to the shifting of some of their concomi- 

 tant elements — as when the reason for a taboo 

 shifts from the ground of religious avoidance 

 to that of mere custom. 



In the foregoing remarks I have tried to 

 show why Mr. Graebner's negative critique 

 of parallelism and convergence does not 

 seem to me conclusive. Just as little con- 

 vincing appear to me the arguments on which 

 he bases his method of determining cultural 

 relationships. Here, also, the fundamental 

 error seems to me based on the complete dis- 

 regard of mental phenomena. Mr. Graebner 

 lays down the following methodological prin- 

 ciple : Two or more phenomena are com- 

 parable, and the one may be used to interpret 

 the other, if it can be shown that they belong, 

 if not to the same local cultural complex, at 

 least to the same cultural group " (p. 64). It 

 seems to me an entirely arbitrary hypothesis 

 to assume a priori the homogeneity of similar 

 phenomena belonging to the same cultural 

 group. Mr. Graebner explains his standpoint 

 by the example of the discussion of agricul- 



