SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXrV. No. 884 



tural rites in Frazer's " Golden Bough," and 

 accepts the discussion on account of the homo- 

 geneity of the cultural groups of Europe and 

 western Asia, from which the examples have 

 been taken. This part of Frazer's deductions 

 seems to me just as unmethodical as the others 

 which are based on examples taken from a 

 wider series of cultural groups. The concepts 

 of comparability and homogeneity, as I under- 

 stand them, have to deal not only with his- 

 torical relationship, but to a much higher 

 degree with psychological similarity, for only 

 as elements of the mental makeup of society 

 do ideas or actions become potent and deter- 

 mining elements of further development. To 

 give an instance of what I mean: If the aged 

 are killed by one people for economic reasons, 

 by another to insure them a happy future life, 

 then the two customs are not comparable, even 

 if they should have their origin in the same 

 historical sources. Graebner's idea appears 

 clearly in the following statement : "If in 

 different parts of the earth peoples are found 

 that are closely related in their ways of think- 

 ing and feeling, evidently the same question 

 arises, that has been treated before in regard 

 to cultural forms, viz., whether these similari- 

 ties are not based on community of descent or 

 on early cultural contact" (p. 112). Such a 

 view can be maintained only if we disregard 

 the action of inner forces, that may lead two 

 people of like cultural possessions after their 

 separation to entirely distinct conditions. In 

 short it is based on the view of a very limited 

 action of internal forces. 



Through the restriction of comparability 

 and interpretation exclusively to the phenom- 

 ena of transmission and original unity — a 

 definition that I do not find given, but that is 

 everywhere implied — and by the hypothesis, 

 that ethnic phenomena that occur in two areas 

 due to transmission or to original unity will 

 always remain comparable and can be mu- 

 tually interpreted, the author is necessarily 

 led to his conclusions, which are merely a re- 

 statement of his incomplete definitions and of 

 his hypothesis; for, if we call comparable ex- 

 clusively phenomena that are historically re- 

 lated, naturally then there can be no other 



kind of comparability, and psychological eth- 

 nology does not exist. 



Exactly the same criticism must be made 

 against the sense in which the term " causal 

 connection " is used. Here also the psycho- 

 logical connections are intentionally excluded, 

 because the psychological argument, its 

 method and validity, are not congenial to the 

 author ; and " causal connection " is simply 

 identified with historical connection. On this 

 basis only can I understand the statement that 

 in literary tradition causal relations are di- 

 rectly given (p. 73). This is not meant to 

 refer to modern historical science, but to the 

 literary sources of Asia and Europe. Is not 

 literary tradition on the whole proof of the 

 misunderstanding of causal relations, rather 

 than the reverse — provided we understand 

 under causal nexus not the simple mechanical 

 aspect of transmission, but the complex social 

 conditions that admit transmission and that 

 bring about internal changes. 



A correlate of the assumption that ethnic 

 elements that are genetically related remain 

 always comparable plays a most important 

 part in Mr. Graebner's method of proving cul- 

 tural relations : " Whenever a phenomenon ap- 

 pears as an inorganic element in its ethnic 

 surroundings, its presence is due to transmis- 

 sion." This might be true if primitive cul- 

 tures were homogeneous units; which, how- 

 ever, is not the case. The more we learn of 

 primitive culture, the clearer it becomes that 

 not only is the participation of each individual 

 in the culture of his tribe of an individual 

 character, or determined by the social group- 

 ing of the tribe, but that also in the same 

 mind the most heterogeneous complexes of 

 habits, thoughts and actions may lie side by 

 side, without ever coming into conflict. The 

 opinion expressed by Mr. Graebner seems to 

 me so little true, that I rather incline toward 

 the reverse opinion. It seems at least plaus- 

 ible, although it has never been proved, that 

 on the whole only such ethnic features are 

 transmitted that in some way conform to the 

 character of some feature of the life of the 

 people that adopt them. The criterion in 

 question seems to me, therefore, not accept- 



