550 



SCIENCE 



[N. S. Vol. XXXVIII. No. 981 



and a program is projected for anotlier volume 

 whieli will complete the work. 



Perhaps the point of chief interest to the 

 student of science in this volume is Baldwin's 

 solution of the dualism of inner and outer con- 

 trols developed especially in Volume II. It 

 may be remembered that the actual and the 

 imaginative are there contrasted with each 

 other and traced to the external world, on the 

 one hand, and to the self on the other. This 

 knowledge and semblance " is the universal 

 and ever-present contrast in the meanings of 

 cognition." The imaginative rendering is 

 always instrumental to the actual and the 

 true. " We make-believe in order that we may 

 believe." " The two controls (the inner and 

 the outer) are now adjusted to each other 

 through the mediation of ideas or thoughts." 

 That is to say, the imagined or merely thought, 

 under the inner control of the self, is instru- 

 mental to the attainment of truth. The work 

 then distinguishes two sorts of knowledge to 

 the attainment of which the imaginative is 

 instrumental, namely theoretical knowledge 

 and practical. Hence arises the question 

 " whether there are other types of apprehension 

 which either set up still further ends or in 

 some way reduce or reconcile the duality dis- 

 closed by these two." To this question Baldwin 

 replies, " There is a type of imaginative cog- 

 nition, I wish at once to say, that does not 

 allow of description under either of the two 

 foregoing headings; a type which is motived 

 not by the interest of completeness of knowl- 

 edge or thought, nor yet by the interest of 

 seeking satisfactions or working practical ef- 

 fects. There is a way of treating a content, 

 usually and properly called ' esthetic,' that we 

 may describe as both over-logical and over- 

 praciical, as not being strictly either of these, 

 although involving both of them " (13) . " The 

 outcome of our investigation is that in the 

 esthetic mode of experience so defined, we have 

 the only inkling of the way that the self -reality 

 of inner control which is the postulate of the 

 practical and the worthful, and the thing- 

 reality of external control which is the pre- 

 supposition of knowledge and truth, can in the 

 process of experience come together after hav- 



ing fallen apart in the development of cogni- 

 tion." 



The last statement may be regarded as the 

 main thesis of this third volume. It means 

 that we are interested in practical and in theo- 

 retical knowledge because of a profound es- 

 thetic impulse which finds satisfaction now in 

 the one and now in the other. The funda- 

 mental categories of the ethico-political con- 

 sciousness as well as those of the scientific con- 

 sciousness are esthetic. The objects of both 

 kinds of knowledge are comprehended in a 

 Whole beautiful which is known in contempla- 

 tion. In that Whole both the self and the 

 world of scientific knowledge find their fulfill- 

 ment and satisfaction. It is their reality. 



The intellectual project of this work, and its 

 genetic method of investigation, are most in- 

 teresting ; but many will find difficulties in the 

 final results. To the present writer, the dual- 

 ism of inner and outer controls seems to be a 

 presupposition of Baldwin's entire treatment 

 of cognition, and consequently his esthetic ex- 

 perience, like Kant's purposive Urtheilshraft, 

 can have only phenomenal validity. Moreover, 

 we find Baldwin's discussion of the practical 

 quite unsatisfactory. Does Baldwin mean that 

 practise can be reduced to terms of knowledge- 

 of -practise ? The section on the " Logic of 

 Practise " is devoted to the subject of affec- 

 tive logic, in the sense of Eibot, and we do not 

 find in it a recognition of the world of human 

 action with its rights and obligations, its free- 

 dom and responsibility. Finally, the question 

 occurs to us whether Baldwin's beautiful Whole 

 difl'ers much, except in name, from Bradley's 

 Absolute; for that also is a form of immediate 

 experience. That method of Bradley's great 

 book and that of Baldwin's are radically dif- 

 ferent, but are their results so far removed 

 from each other as their methods ? 



G. A. Tawnet 



Univeesity of Cincinnati 



Lehrhuch der Algelra. Von Heinrich Weber. 

 Kleine Ausgabe in einem Bande. Braun- 

 schweig. Vieweg und Sohn. 1912. Pp. x -\- 

 528. 

 Among the advanced text-books on algebra 



