Aucust 13, 1897. ] 
cution through my preliminary report. 
Through ignorance of the nature of such 
report on the part of the defence, no change 
was made in the character of the testimony 
during the cross-examination, and I was 
permitted to leave the witness stand with 
a portion of my story untold. No witnesses 
were called for the defence, and the case 
was given to the jury with the darkest of 
prospects for the prisoner. 
For many reasons, unnecessary to recount 
here, I was distinctly of the opinion that 
murder had been committed, but I felt 
nevertheless that common justice demanded 
that the prisoner should have been entitled 
to whatever doubt could have been thrown 
upon the minds of the jury, no matter how 
far-fetched the foundations for such doubt 
might have been. 
The first trial having resulted in a dis- 
agreement of the jury, 1 was pleased to 
learn, before the second hearing of the case 
began, that the defence was prepared to go 
into the question of the embalming fluid ; 
for the responsibility of permitting only a 
part of what I knew to be drawn from me, 
to the entire exclusion of the remaining 
portion, was greater than I wished to as- 
sume. The nature of my report to the Cor- 
oner having been established, and certain 
opinions relating thereto having been fully 
ventilated, the jury were possessed of ‘rea- 
sonable doubt’ and acquitted the prisoner. 
What now were the duties of the expert 
upon the occasion of the first trial of this 
case and how should he have construed the 
meaning of his oath ? 
One eminent legal light, to whom the 
question was referred, held that the expert 
was distinctly the property of the side em- 
ploying him, and that his duty was simply 
to answer truthfully the questions put to 
him, without attempting to enlighten the 
Court on facts known to him, but not 
brought out by the examination, no matter 
how vital such facts might be. 
SCIENCE. 
~ but let them be as few as possible. 
245 
Another held that although the above 
course would be proper in a civil case, yet, 
in a matter involving life and death, the 
witness should insist upon the Court be- 
coming acquainted with his whole story. 
Do not such differences in legal opinion 
make it very desirable that the expert, at 
least in capital cases, should bean employee 
of the bench rather than of the bar, in order 
that whatever scientific investigations are 
made may be entirely open to public knowl- 
edge and criticism ? 
Although the expert should earnestly 
strive to have what he has to say presented 
in the best form, he must remember that to 
secure clearness, particularly before a jury, 
technicalities should be reduced to a mini- 
mum. To a degree they are unavoidable, 
Illus- 
trations should be homely and apt; capable 
of easy grasp by the jury’s minds, and, if 
possible, taken from scenes familiar to the 
jury in their daily lives. 
It is an unfortunate fact that the expert 
must be prepared to encounter in the court 
room not only unfamiliarity with his spe- 
cialty, but also deep-rooted prejudices and 
popular notions hoary with age and not to be 
lightly removed from the mind by the words 
of a single witness. As President Jordan 
has wellsaid, ‘‘ There is no nonsense so un- 
scientific that men called educated will not 
accept it as a science;”’ and, let me add, they 
will calmly attempt to shove the burden of 
proof upon the scientific man who is opposed 
to their views. Sanitary experts, in par- 
ticular, run up against all sorts of popular 
superstitions and are inveighed against as 
‘professors’ by those who consider them- 
selves the ‘ practical’ workers of the time; 
and, let it be noted, the burden of proof is 
uniformly laid upon these ‘professors’ ’ 
shoulders, while the most astounding and 
occult statements made by the ‘ practical’ 
men may be received without verification. 
One source of trouble, which perhaps is 
