598 
preface that ‘there are no modern works in 
English from which any help is to be derived in 
the treatment of epistemological problems,’ and 
that the present volume ‘asks and should re- 
ceive the treatment due to a pioneer work’ 
(p. viii.) It is perhaps psychologically in- 
evitable that the reformer should regard him- 
self as standing alone, that he should be unable 
to see that there are other knees which have 
not bowed unto Baal. It will no doubt be en- 
couraging to Professor Ladd to learn that, in 
spite of his conviction that no help is to be 
found in Mr. Hobhouse’s recent work since 
it deals with logic (vide, note p. viii.), he may 
discover there a theory of knowledge similar in 
many respects to his own. ‘There are also sey- 
eral other modern books on logic which cannot 
fairly be accused of treating the nature of 
thought in a merely formal way, and in which 
the fundamental conceptions which Professor 
Ladd himself uses are very clearly laid down. 
And among psychological writers there are 
surely several—Ward, James, Stout, to men- 
tion but three names—from whom some assist- 
ance might be derived in a discussion of the 
nature of cognition. My own opinion is that 
philosophers at the present day have some 
ground for encouragement and congratula- 
tion, in the fact that substantial agreement 
has been reached on so many important points 
connected with this very subject. While gladly 
acknowledging the independence and value of 
Professor Ladd’s treatment, I should still say 
that it has been largely made possible by the 
work which has appeared in English during the 
last twenty years. 
The first chapter of the volume is occupied 
with a discussion of the nature of the problem, 
while the two following chapters contain an 
excellent, though somewhat summary, account 
of historical theories of cognition. ‘‘ The fun- 
damental problem of the philosophy of knowl- 
edge is an inquiry into the relations between 
certain states of consciousness and what we 
conceive of as ‘the really existing’ ’’ (p. 10). 
“Tt accepts as its problem cognition including 
all its necessary implicates’? (p. 17). Among 
these implicates is that of an extra-mental re- 
ality different from the knowing subject. ‘‘To 
know is to make an ontological leap, a spring 
SCIENCE. 
[N.S. Vou. VI. No. 146. 
from the charmed circle of pure subjectivity 
into the mystery of the real’? (p. 22). If we 
ask, now, how it is possible to guarantee the 
validity of knowledge, we find that it is impos- 
sible to discover any outside standard by means 
of which it may be tested. ‘‘ Critical analysis 
of the nature of experience, with a view to 
certify it, ends in the discovery of aspects, or 
factors, or implicates, of every exercise of cog- 
nitive faculty which are self-certifying’’ (p. 
105). 
A point upon which great emphasis is laid is 
the objective nature of cognition. ‘‘It is the 
very reverse of truth to say that knowledge is 
merely subjective; for till the stream of con- 
sciousness, the state or the activity of the 
knowing subject, has become also objective, 
cognition has not taken place’’ (p. 115). 
Judgment, in which the cognitive activity in- 
volved in thinking culminates, ‘‘is not genu- 
ine judgment without a trans-subjective refer- 
ence, an implication of the actual connection 
of different ‘momenta’ in a really existing 
world’’ (p. 149). Professor Ladd also strongly 
insists that knowing is not an affair of any one 
set of faculties, but involves the whole mind. 
Feeling and willing are implied in every cog- 
nitive act, and belong to the very nature of 
knowledge. Two chapters (Chap. vi., Knowl- 
edge as Feeling and Willing ; and Chap. xvii., 
Ethical and Alsthetical Momenta of Knowl- 
edge ) are devoted to enforcing and illustrating 
this doctrine, which is so often forgotten by 
those who discuss the nature of knowledge. 
“In the formation and criticism of every al- 
leged cognitive judgment, the entire mind of 
the subject, whose is the judgment, takes part”’ 
p. 502). ‘‘The different aspects or sides of 
human nature do not stand apart, as it were, 
from the ordinary working of cognitive facuity. 
* * * he rather must they all be considered 
as factors, or ‘momenta’ essentially present 
and effective in the integrating process that 
gives the object as a totality to the mind, and 
that shapes the actual synthesis in which the 
cognitive judgment consists’’ (p. 508). 
The author finds, further, that the reality of 
both subject and object,and also that ofa relation 
between the two, are ‘implicated’ in every act 
of self-conscious experience. But how shall 
