OcTOBER 15, 1897. ] 
we conceiye of this relation? In cognition an 
obvious distinction of subject and object is pre- 
supposed. But their complete incomparability 
is denied, and their actual unification in some 
form is affirmed (p. 206). This unification can 
take place ‘only if the conception of one of the 
two—either of thing or of self—can be so ex- 
tended in a valid way as to provide an expla- 
nation for the other, and for the relation of 
knowledge between the two’ (p. 216). The 
concept of the Self, the author finds, is alone 
capable of such extension. It furnishes the 
key or interpretation to all that we know about 
things. That is, it is only when things are con- 
ceived as in some sort analogous to the Self 
that they can be known at all. Our knowl- 
edge of the Self is direct and intuitive and has 
the highest degree of certainty. Indeed, it is 
because we fail to attain the same perfection in 
knowing, when dealing with things, that we be- 
come dissatisfied with the limits, etc., of our 
knowledge (p. 252). The author’s doctrine on 
the nature of our knowledge of the Self requires 
further elaboration to render it perfectly clear. 
He seems, however, to believe that we here get 
beyond the antithesis of subject and object, 
and are, in a sense, face to face with reality. 
He himself sums up his chapter on the knowl- 
edge of Things and of Self as follows: ‘‘While 
the knowledge of Self may attain an intuitive 
penetration to the heart of reality, the knowl- 
edge of things remains an analogical interpreta- 
tion of their apparent behavior into terms of a 
real nature corresponding, in important char- 
acteristics, to our own”? (p. 226). 
This conception of the Self as the central 
point of knowledge determines, to a very im- 
portant extent, the character of the discussions 
which follow. The meaning of Identity and 
Difference and of the principle of Sufficient 
Reason are found in the nature of the Self. 
And, similarly, the author’s conclusions regard- 
ing the teleological character of knowledge, and 
the necessity of employing teleology to under- 
stand completely the nature of things, follows 
directly from the doctrine that knowing is an 
interpretation of things by the Self in the light 
of what it knows about its own nature. The 
author’s discussion of Experience and the Trans- 
cendent (Chap. xi.) is extremely interesting. 
SCIENCE. 
599 
We cannot, he argues, know anything that is 
not somehow implicate in our experience. But 
every experience implies the existence of con- 
ditions which transcend itasmere fact. Hence 
to know is just to reach beyond the mere fac- 
tual aspect of experience to its underlying con- 
ditions (pp. 325-35). 
The theory of reality outlined in the present 
volume shows marked traces of the influence of 
Lotze. No meaning can be given to the con- 
cept of related things ‘‘unless things are con- 
ceived of as self-active beings, with their 
various modes of behavior interdependent and 
yet united under a framework, so to speak, of 
immanent ideas’? (p. 360). Inthe same way, the 
relation between the individual and the ground 
of reality is conceived asa relation of minds or 
selves. ‘‘Human cognition is all to be under- 
stood as a species of intercourse between minds, 
In all man’s knowledge the real being of the 
finite Self is in actual commerce with the abso- 
lute Self. The relation of an intercourse be- 
tween Selves is the one fundamental and 
permanent conception under which may be 
truthfully included all the particular forms of 
relation of which we have experience in the de- 
velopment of the life of cognition’’ (p. 558). 
J. E. CREIGHTON. 
CORNELL UNIVERSITY. 
Elementary Geology. By RALPH S. TARR, B.5., 
F.G. 5. A., Professor of Dynamic Geology 
and Physical Geography at Cornell Univer- 
sity. New York, The Macmillan Company. 
1897. Price, $1.40. 
Occasion for the publication of another ele- 
mentary text-book on geology, in addition to 
the number of good works previously available, 
is found in the ‘need of a geology in which 
more stress is placed upon the dynamic aspect 
of the subject than is commonly given.’ It is 
the author’s opinion that stratigraphic geology 
—that is, as the term is used in this work, the 
history of the earth’s development—contains 
too much abstract fact for the average high 
school student, whereas structural and dynamic 
geology, which treat respectively of the ma- 
terials composing the earth’s mass and the 
forces affecting it, may be presented in simpler 
form. ‘‘Here the body of fact necessary for 
