October 7, 1892.] 



SCIENCE. 



205 



reflection, we can only know of them by their effects on the 

 chain of presentation. The reason for this is that feeling is not 

 presentation, and "what is not presented cannot be repre- 

 sented." " How can that which was not originally a cognition 

 become such by being reproduced ? " 



It cannot. But do we need to identify the known with know- 

 ing, in order that it may be known? Must feeling be made into 

 a cognition to be cognized ? It is obvious enough that no feeling 

 can be revived into a re-presentation of itself, but no more can 

 any cognition or any mental activity. Revival or recurrence of 

 •comciousness can never constitute consciousness of consciousness 

 which is an order apart. If cognition is only presentation and 

 re-presentation of objects, we can never attain any apprehen- 

 sion of consciousness, any cognition of a cognition or of a feeling 

 or of a volition, for they are all equally in this sense subjective 

 acts Re presentation at any degree is never by itself sense of 

 re-presentation or knowledge of the presentation. 



Of course, the doctrine of relativity applies to introspection as 

 to all cognition, and subject qua subject is as unknowable as ob- 

 ject qua object. We do not know feeling ra itself, nor anything 

 •Ise in itself, the subjective like the objective ding an sich is be- 

 yond our ken. Yet kinds of consciousness are as directly appre- 

 hended and discriminated as kinds of things,but the knowing is, as 

 such, distinct from the known even when knowing is known. 

 Here the act knowing is not the act known and is different in 

 value. The object known is not, at least from the purely psycho- 

 logical point of view, ever to be confounded with the knowing, 

 to be incorporated into cognition by virtue of being cognized. 

 Feeling, then, seems to be as directly known by introspection and 

 reflection as any other process. It is not a hypothetical cause 

 brought in by the intellect to explain certain mental phenomena, 

 but it is as distinctly and directly apprehended as cognition or 

 Tolition. 



The distinction between having a feeling and knowing a feel- 

 ing is a very real one, though common phraseology confuses 

 them. We say of a brave man, he never knew fear; by 

 which we mean he never feared, never experienced fear, and not 

 that he was ignorant of fear. Again, in like manner, we say 

 aometiraes of a very healthy person, he never knew what pain 

 was, meaning he never felt pain. These expressions convey a 

 truth in that they emphasize that necessity of experience in the 

 exercise of the subjective method upon which we have already 

 commented, but still they obscure a distinction which must be 

 apparent to scientific analysis. We cannot know feeling except 

 through realization, yet the knowing is not the i-ealization. Being 

 aware of the pain and the feeling pain are distinct acts of con- 

 sciousness. All feeling, pain and pleasure, is direct conscious- 

 ness, but knowledge of it is reflex, is consciousness of conscious- 

 ness. The cognition of the pain as an object, a fact of conscious- 

 ness, is surely a%iistinct act from the pain in consciousness, from 

 the fact itself. The pain disturbance is one thing and the intro- 

 spective act by which it is cognized quite another. 



These two acts are not always associated though they are com- 

 monly regarded as inseparable. It is a common postulate that if 

 jou have a pain you will know it, or notice it. If we feel pained 

 we will alway.s know it. This seemingly true statement comes 

 ■of a confounding of terms. If I have a pain I must, indeed, be 

 aware of it,know it. in the sense that it must be in consciousness; 

 but this makes, aware of pain, and knowing pain, such very 

 general phrases as to equal experience of pain or having pain. 

 But there is no knowledge in pain itself, nor pain in the knowing 

 act per se. The knowing the pain must be different from the 

 pain itself, and is not always a necessary sequent. We may ex- 

 perience pain without cognizing it as such. When drowsy in bed 

 I may feel pain of my foot being "asleep," but not know it as a 

 mental fact. We may believe, indeed, that pain often rises and 

 subsides in consciousness without our being cognizant of it, but, 

 of course, in the nature of the case there is no direct proof, for 

 proof implies cognizance of fact. Pain as mental fact, an object 

 for consciousness, not an experience in consciousness, is what is 

 properly meant by knowing pain. Consciousness-of-pain as 

 knowledge of it is not aUvays involved by pain-inconsciousness 

 as experience of it. Consciousness of pain by its double njeaning 



as cognizance of pain and experience of pain leads easily to ob- 

 scurity of thought upon this subject. But experience does not, 

 if we may trust the general law of evolution from simple to com 

 plex, at the first contain consciousness of experience. This latter 

 element is but gradually built up into experience, though in the 

 end they are so permanently united in developed ego life that it 

 is difBcult to perceive their distinctness and independence. 



We conclude then that while not all feelings, that is, pains and 

 pleasures, are discovered simply by virtue of being acts of con- 

 sciousness, and that not all consciousness is apperceptive of itself, 

 yet in general feelings are known as such, and there is nothing 

 in their nature to make them only indirectly observable by con- 

 sciousness. The direct subjective method certainly presents great 

 difficulties especially in evolutionary psychology, but still it must 

 be accounted the only method for feeling as for all regions of 

 psychic life.' 



REMARKS ON AMERICAN LICHENOLOGY. —II. 



BY W. W. CALKINS. 



In the Lichens the geographical distribution of species is quite 

 as interesting as in phaenogamia. I shall in this paper confine 

 myself to observations and collections made in the subtropical 

 section of our country. The tracing of species to their native 

 habitats, and thence following them over often wide areas of dis- 

 persion until arrested in their progress by conditions unsuitable 

 to their growth, is an important work for the botanist and for 

 science. Florida — more especially its southern extremity — offers 

 an attractive field and unusual advantages. One may draw a line 

 east and west across the State in about latitude 25°, and below 

 this will be found new conditions of soil, climate, and produc- 

 tions. A new and peculiar flora exuberant in growth will come 

 into view. With both shores laved by the warm waters of the Gulf 

 Stream, that "river in the ocean," also the Bahamas and Cuba 

 less than one hundred miles distant, the reasons for the similarity 

 of life to that of the Antillean system are plain. One has only to 

 wander along these sunny shores and gather by bushels the proofs 

 of what I say in such species as Guilandma, Bondue, Mucuna, 

 Urens. etc., that have been brought by the sea from other climes. 

 Then tropical Algae claim the attention. Approximately the 

 line I have mentioned represents two vast and dissimilar floras, 

 each overstepping somewhat the territory of the other, but retain- 

 ing the mastery in their respective fields. Here northern forms 

 become intruders, southern less common. Many arborescent ones 

 dwindle to shrubs. Per contra, further north the same law ob- 

 tains. Thus hath nature set her limits. Standing on this border- 

 land, and amazed at the change in the higher orders, I wished to 

 know about the lower. In this field not much has been done. 

 Our knowledge of the lichens has been until recently limited. It 

 is my purpose to extend this knowledge somewhat, believing that 

 it may be useful. 



Most of the species described by Nylander and Tuckerman, as 

 from Cuba and some from further south, will be found in Florida. 

 The great order Graphidacei. one of the most perplexing, abounds 

 in new species, and I am satisfied that further research will add 

 to the number in this and other orders. I now make nearly four 

 hundred and fifty species, which is indeed a great number for 

 one section when we remember that only a few years ago Willey 

 estimated that ultimately one thousand might be found on the 

 entire continent. The final total in Florida will exceed five hun- 

 dred ; and I allow for some reductions which must follow their 

 final resolution, for, as hinted in a former paper, this is more 

 important than new species, especially if, as asserted, " species 

 only exist in text-books," — a proposition from which I dissent. 



The following observations will only embrace a few of the 

 rarer and little-known forms collected by me, and some others of 

 my discovery described as new to science: Gyalecta cuhana Nyl. 

 On calciferous rocks, Keys of Florida, and on the main land Also 

 in Cuba. Identified by Dr. Nylander. Chiodecton sphcerale Nyl. 

 A rare tropical form first found by me near Jacksonville — and 



^ For a special carrying: out of the principles herein advocated see the 

 writer's article on Primitive Consciousness in the Phdosophical Review, July, 



18v)2. 



