THE CUBA REVIEW 19 



cents a pound, this being reduced by the terms of the Reciprocity Treaty existing between 

 Cuba and the United States to 1.60 cents on sugar from Cuba. This preliminary tariff 

 bill was to be effective over a period of only six months, but in view of the fact 

 that the final measure had not been prepared and approved at the expiration of this 

 period, President Harding by decree prolonged the preliminary measure to stand until 

 a final bill was passed. During this interv-al the Tariff Committee of the Senate pro- 

 posed the increase of the duty of 1.6 cents to 1.84 cents, but this was met with such an 

 outcry on the part of both the American public and the Cuban sugar interests, that the 

 jonit Tariff Committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives slightly later 

 approved the compromise figure of 1.7648 cents per pound on Cuba's sugar, this cor- 

 responding to 2.2 cents per pound on sugars from other sources. Our readers will 

 remember that at the time of the first increase of dut)', supply was very much more than 

 equal to demand, so that the increase of practically 59 cents per 100 lbs. in the duty 

 was deducted from the price paid Cuba's producers, thus at the time affecting them 

 very seriously. The change of statistical position which has since occurred causes one 

 to lose sight of the excessive duty now being paid on our sugar, and doubtless the im- 

 portance of the question will not again come up until world production overtakes con- 

 siderably world consumption. It is a question, however, if the increase in duty is not 

 in reality advantageous to Cuba's industry, as the increased difference between the 

 duty on sugars from other sources and that paid by Cuba renders additionally difficult 

 competition by other outside sugars with those produced here. Under the old tariff 

 rate, a difference of about 24 cents per 100 pounds existed, and under the new about 44 

 cents is the difference, this sum being sufficient, we believe, to practically prevent 

 under even approximately normal market conditions the entry into the United States of 

 other sugars than those from Cuba as long as a supply of these is available. 



That the opinion that this higher rate of duty is not beneficial to Cuba is held by 

 a great many is shown by the formation during the year of a body in Cuba known as 

 the National Defense Committee, composed of members of our commercial and indus- 

 trial world. This Committee is operating in cooperation with manufacturers and refiners 

 of the North, whose interests are bound up with those of Cuba either through their 

 need for supplies of our raw product or who find Cuba under normal conditions an 

 excellent market for their products. The intention is that a propaganda be waged by 

 this Committee to instruct the people of the United States with regard to the relative 

 costs of the production of beet sugar and Cuban cane sugar, with the idea of securing 

 more favorable treatment of the latter by the American Congress. The most recent 

 recommendation, however, made to this Committee has been that of Mr. Horatio S. 

 Rubens, that the propaganda of the Committee tend not to the lowering of the duty 

 now being collected on Cuba's sugar on its entry into the United States, but to a modi- 

 fication of the present reciprocity treaty by which the preferential now given Cuba's 

 products, especially her sugar, be increased. What is most advisable can, it seems to 

 us, be determined only after a thorough study of the possibilities of the beet sugar in- 

 dustry in the United States. If the existing tariff is such as to enable beet sugar to be 

 produced at an attractive profit in the United States, and if bodies of land of sufficient 

 area are available for this production, it would seerti that the attractive profits to be 

 realized would cause the expansion of this industry to a point such that the production 

 of sugar in the United States would be sufficient to supply the demands of that nation. 

 Under those circumstances, the death-knell of Cuba's sugar industr>' would have sounded, 

 and under these circumstances it would seem that the object to be accomplished would 

 be to secure a reduction of the duty now imposed upon our sugar upon its entry into 

 the United States, thus lowering the possible profit to the United States sugar beet in- 

 dustry, and at the same time the cost of sugar to the American public as a whole. If, 

 howev<*ir, the marginal profit under the existing tariff rate is only moderate, or if the 

 area of land adaptable to the successful raising of sugar beets in the United States is 

 insufficient, the continuation of the present duty and the entering into of a new 



