32 THE CUBA REJ'IE W 



be the same unsatisfactory market for Cubas as obtained during the past year under 

 controL 



On the other hand, Cuban planters might desire to sell at once sugars for shipment 

 after February 1st and if this were instituted by some planters, it is very possible that 

 there would be a flood of offerings from Cuba if any buyers showed interest in a posi- 

 tion so far off. This would result in lower prices, the same as if the control were abso- 

 lutely off. Furthermore, a disturbing situation in Cuba is the unemployed labor and 

 it may cause a very serious situation to delay grinding until February 1st, as there is 

 no other employment for these laborers except in the cane fields and sugar factories, 

 and people without the means of purchasing food are in some instances rendered des- 

 perate and some damage might accrue to sugar properties throughout the Island. Any 

 restriction on the size of the Cuba crop will tend to increase so^\dngs of beet roots in 

 Europe as a crop of sugar from beets can be more ciuickly made than from cane. 



In our opmion, if Cuba is let alone vnih free and unrestricted dealings in sugar, Cuba 

 will ciuickly rehabilitate herself, and we can go back in our records to the time of the 

 Spanish War as an example. From 1896 up to 1899 when the Spanish-American War 

 occurred, Cuba was imder the control of Spain and during this period of time Spain 

 was constantly at war with the Cuban patriots. This chaotic condition made sugar 

 manufacturing practically impossible except in localities that were either close to the 

 large cities where Spanish troops could protect the factories or else in those districts 

 which paid tribute to the Cuban patriots in order to be allowed to grind. Under such 

 conditions, Cuba was only enabled to make in 1896-97 a crop of 212,051 tons, and at 

 the time of America's entrance into the War, a crop of 345,000 tons. At the close of 

 the War and the establishment of a Cuban government, there was absolutely no money 

 in Cuba. The sugar factories to a great extent were either dismantled or destroyed 

 or in such poor condition that they could make no sugar whatsoever. However, every- 

 body interested in sugar in Cuba put their shoulders to the wheel and inside of ten years 

 their crop reached close to the two million mark or say, 1,804,349 tons. What Cuba 

 did before can be done again and there is, in our opinion, no necessity of any further 

 control in order to allow Cuba to rehabiUtate herself. 



It is frequentl}' stated that cheap prices have a tendency to restrict the produc- 

 tion of sugar. It has rarely been the case as far as sugar is concerned. ]\Iany other 

 crops, such as wheat, corn, cotton, etc., are very much dependent on the price obtain- 

 able for the finished product but such does not appear to be general in connection with 

 sugar. For instance in 1902 when a crop of 855,181 tons was made, the average price 

 of Cuban sugar for the year, c. & f., was 1.857c. per pound and naturally one would 

 suppose that with such a low figure the next succeeding Cuban crop would be materially 

 curtailed. Such, however, was not the fact as the next crop reached 998,878 tons a- 

 though the price of sugar that year only averaged 2.035c. c. & f. Even this low figure 

 had no effect on Cuba as the next following crop reached 1,040,000 tons. The world 

 supph' during this period of three years averaged about 10,000,000 tons, although the 

 1902-03 world's supply decreased about 1,000,000 tons, but this was entirely induced 

 by a very unsatisfactory gro^^•ing season for European beet sugars in the Campaign 

 year 1902-03, which came on top of somewhat reduced somngs owing to the fact of 

 the formation of the Brussels Convention which was instigated to do away \\\ih. the 

 pacing of bounties, etc., on exports. It was thought by Europe, that, o\\ing to the 

 abrogation of bounties on export sugars, bounties allowing sugar for export at much 

 cheaper prices than it was obtainable for their o-mi use, that there would be a decline 

 in exports. Such, however, was not the case to any large extent and ultimately' the 

 beet crop of Europe increased until it reached the maximum figure of 8,317,637 tons in 

 1912-13 and with a total world supply available at that time of 18,243,235 tons. It will 

 thus be seen that in Europe as well as in Cuba the reduction in crops was not caused by 

 the low prices but was occasioned by bad weather, legislation, etc. 



Under such conditions, sugar proves itself to be one of the most remarkable of 

 commodities and reverts from an unfavorable situation more quickly than practically 



