July 22, 1898.] 



SCIENCE. 



do with its rise and maintenance in the in- 

 dividual, and this assumption, when it is 

 generalized, becomes the law that structure 

 precedes function in the individual develop- 

 ment. The whole movement of thought is 

 due to the attribution of a merely abstract 

 and external significance to the part." 



6. "The postulate of the independence 

 of parts is further found in the biological 

 treatment of latent and of alternative parts 

 and qualities. * * * The manifold features 

 of the organism are latent in the germ; 

 * * * regeneration of lost parts is due to 

 the existence of the necessary parts in a 

 latent condition ;**=!= all organic differ- 

 ences are inherited in latency and may vary 

 when latent ; * * * each generation in al- 

 teration of generations contains the other in 

 latent condition; each sex holds as latent the 

 alternative characters to its own ; every 

 change which the species undergoes in new 

 conditions was latent in it before. * * * La- 

 tency is the chief category of biology. * * * 

 Now, whatever is latent is simply not there ; 

 it has no existence. * * * Latency is possi- 

 bility, and a thing is possible because of 

 something else. And the problem of 

 biology is to find a form for that some- 

 thing else. * * * The biological treat- 

 ment of latent qualities shows that they 

 are looked upon as independent of the 

 rest." Against this position the author 

 urges the great number of possibilities open 

 to an organism under varying stimuli. 

 " There is much more latent in an organism 

 than is ever actual at any one time, and if 

 all the possibilities are separate things we 

 must invent a form for them in which they 

 can be present in infinite numbers within 

 a microscopic cell." In his treatment of 

 alternative qualities the author admits that 

 latency is not the same as possibility, for 

 here we have one of two perfect forms de- 

 veloped, which may be wonderfully adapted 

 to each other, as, for example, in the two 

 sexes. He concludes, as have all who have 



reflected upon this subject, that it is neces- 

 sary to assume some mechanism which will 

 react in one of two definite ways. In 

 treating of this subject his use of the word 

 Anlage is unusual. " The Anlage," says he, 

 " is not a thing which has ever been seen, 

 but is that hypothetical object which repre- 

 sents the latent existence of one future par- 

 ticular." A glance at any text-book of 

 embryology would show that a nascent, 

 visible structure which has not yet the form 

 and function of the developed part is 

 frequently called the Anlage of that part. 



7. Finally, this postulate dominates the 

 doctrines of organic evolution ; since each 

 part exists in its own right, it is easy to 

 imagine the putting together of this or that 

 adaptation, the subtraction or addition of 

 this or that part to any extent and in any 

 combination that is able to survive. 



In conclusion, the author afiirms : "Or- 

 ganic differences of every kind are not 

 separate elements ; they are not numerable 

 units, and the organism is not a mere sum 

 of such units. To find that this is the 

 case one has only to attempt to find one 

 character in an organism which is not at 

 once a part of a larger whole and itself 

 capable of analysis into a hundred subordi- 

 nate relations. * * * However much we 

 may appear to gain for biology by separa- 

 ting the organism into things which play 

 upon one another externally, * * * we 

 really do no more than to do away with the 

 individuality of a natural system in order 

 to invest its parts with the more unique 

 character of moral agents." 



II. The second postulate, viz., that there 

 is a self -detei'mining agent within the 

 known body, in which the unity of the 

 organism inheres, is a necessary consequence 

 of the first postulate, for as the latter breaks 

 the organism up into separate and independ- 

 ent qualities so the former finds the unify- 

 ing principle in the anthropomorphic agent. 

 This agent is concieved under two dififerent 



