224 



SGIENGE. 



[N. S. Vol. VIII. No. 190. 



giving a fascinating nearness to animals, uncon- 

 scious of your spying, tlie telescope is most 

 serviceable in interesting young people. 



Hiram M. Stanley. 

 Lake Foeest, III., August 1, 1898. 



SCIENTIFIC LITER AT DEE. 

 La certitude logique. Par G. Milhaud. Paris, 



Felix Alcau. 1898. Pp. 204. 



Those who know what expectations were en- 

 couraged by scholastic philosophy would hope 

 for much from a book with the present title, 

 whether it intended to defend or criticise the 

 pretensions that have been associated with the 

 study of logic. The scholastics thought that 

 logic was the source of all certitude in knowl- 

 edge. The present author's thesis is a denial 

 of this claim. His assertion is that logic can- 

 not give us any certitude beyond particular 

 facts directly observed. This position is based 

 upon the law of contradiction, and the distinc- 

 tion between that which is given and that which 

 is construed. The author attempts to establish 

 his thesis, first directly, and secondly by an 

 appeal to the testimony of mathematics. In 

 neither of his proofs do I think the author suc- 

 cessful in maintaining his position. Not that it 

 is false, but because he has tried to give certi- 

 tude to a proposition by the very method which 

 he says is incapable of doing it. It is in one as- 

 pect of the matter a mere truism that logic can- 

 not give any certitude beyond the facts of indi- 

 vidual experience, but is in another relation a 

 very equivocal proposition. It implies that 

 somebody has claimed, or does claim, logic is 

 the source of all certitude. In the first place, 

 no one since Descartes has claimed this view. 

 In the second place, all first-class thinkers who 

 have attached any value to logic as a means to 

 certitude of any kind limit it to the proof of 

 doubtful propositions, and do not try to supplant 

 experience of simple facts by it. There is an 

 error on the part of logicians and philosophers 

 here which we had hopes that the author would 

 correct. It is true that much of our psycho- 

 logical analysis and past philosophical specula- 

 tion gives the impression that ratiocination is 

 the most important and perhaps ultimate pro- 

 cess in knowledge, assuming all the while that 



as a process it was diflferent from the intuitive. 

 But it is possible to show that ratiocination is 

 only one form of intuition, simply that form 

 which serves as a vehicle for the transmission 

 of certitude from one proposition to another, 

 but it is not the primary organ of rectitude. 

 Here was an opportunity for some good discus- 

 sion of logical processes, but there is no attempt 

 at it. Practically the only reference to logical 

 methods at all is the enunciation of the law of 

 contradictiou. The remainder of the work is 

 occupied with discussion upon the application 

 of mathematics to the sciences, and deals with 

 results, not methods. J. H. Hyslop. 



Le rational. Par Gaston Milhaud. Paris, 



Felix Alcan. 1898. Pp. 180. 



This work is confessedly a supplement to the 

 work on La certitude logique. It professes to 

 discuss more fully the rational processes that 

 are supposed to determine logical certitude, but 

 is in most respects subject to the same strictures 

 that we have applied to the former. The author 

 is better acquainted with the material results of 

 the sciences related to his problem than with 

 the issues involved in logical speculation. Only 

 one chapter looks like an approach to the real 

 question, and even this does not exhibit any 

 conception of what the subject demands. The 

 reasoning of mathematics gave the author the 

 intimation of his problem, but he has not 

 studied the formal processes of logic sufiiciently 

 to see what they represent. His primary inter- 

 est is really in the results of the special sciences, 

 and not at all in methodology. The theme is a 

 most important one at the present time, espe- 

 cially as it affords an opportunity to criticise 

 the implications still remaining in general 

 philosophy after the source of them, namely, 

 the old faculty psychology, has passed away. 

 The old distinction between the rational and 

 the perceptive or immediate consciousness which 

 gave rise to the author's problem no longer 

 exists, and we can reconcile logical certitude 

 with all others. 



J. H. Hyslop. 



Flore Fhanerogamique des Antilles Frangaises, 

 Guadeloupe et Martinique. Par le R. P. Duss, 

 Professeur au CoUfege de la Basse-Terre. 

 Macon. 1897. Svo. Pp. xxviii + 656. 



