Septesiber 2, 1898.] 



SCIENCE. 



303 



over-systematizes, and occasionally strains the 

 meaning of a text. But those who agree with 

 him least will profit by rethinking with such a 

 vigorous and subtle intelligence the entire con- 

 tent of Plato's thought. More specific criti- 

 cism would involve us in questions of meta- 

 physics or in the philological interpretation of 

 texts. Instead of entering upon these details I 

 propose to avail myself of this opportunity to say 

 a word concerning Plato's attitude towards the 

 physical sciences, and the notion, widely preva- 

 lent among modern men of science, that, while 

 Aristotle is the ' master of those who know ' 

 and the pioneer of science inaprescientificage, 

 Plato is the master of those who dream and the 

 incarnate antithesis of the scientific spirit. If 

 this is an error, a brief statement of its causes 

 may be not without interest. Chief of these is 

 the fact that Plato, despite his high attainments 

 in mathematics, was essentially a literary artist 

 and philosopher, while Aristotle, as Lewes' well- 

 known book shows in detail, was a serious in- 

 vestigator, or at least collector of facts, in the 

 biological sciences, and said one or two very 

 quotable things about the charms of the study 

 of Nature's humblest products. 



But the question is not so much of profes- 

 sional occupation as of temper, insight and in- 

 fluence. Now Plato, taking for granted the 

 secondary education in 'music' and gymnastics, 

 demanded that the higher education should be 

 based on a firm foundation of mathematics, as- 

 tronomy, and mathematical physics ; he asked 

 for the endowment of scientific research, and in 

 his obiter dicta concerning the imperfect science 

 of his time he displayed marvellous tact in 

 avoiding the colossal errors into which Aristotle 

 was lead by his reliance on verbal definitions 

 and his ' spirit of system.' How is it, then, that 

 the popular judgment sets Plato down as an 

 opponent of science? No better explanation 

 can be found than Bacon's statement that Plato 

 corrupted science by theology, while Aristotle 

 corrupted it by logic. Plato's predominant 

 ethical interest and his dread of a certain hard 

 dogmatic materialism associated with the name 

 of Democritus led him to insist on the antithesis 

 of spirit and matter, and on a teleological view 

 of the world, in language which sentimentalists 

 have employed as a weapon in the supposed 



' warfare of religion and science.' Like Emer- 

 son, he has borne the burden of the folly of dis- 

 ciples attracted to him solely by a vague sense 

 of the spiritual edification and beauty dimly 

 apprehended in his words. Of course, a teleo- 

 logical view of the world is wholly compatible 

 with science provided the teleology be sufii- 

 ciently abstract and comprehensive. It is the 

 ' surnaturel particulier' with which science wars. 

 But just here Plato's literary and poetic genius 

 has done him harm with certain severe but 

 somewhat literal-minded thinkers. For in his 

 Timxus he deliberately undertook to make the 

 entire universe, as known to the science of the 

 fourth century B. C, a poetical allegory of 

 spiritual and teleological meanings. The liter- 

 ary beauty of this ' Hymn of the Universe ' is a 

 matter of taste — perhaps of acquired taste. But 

 its crude literal acceptance is possible only to a 

 defective historic sense, and leads to the grossest 

 misinterpretations both of Plato and of ancient 

 thought generally. Now, unfortunately, the 

 chief source from which too many men of sci- 

 ence derive their impression of Plato's concep- 

 tion of the world is precisely the Timxus in the 

 bald, literal and unsympathetic resumes given 

 by Grote and Draper. I hope I shall not be 

 accused of wilful parados when I add that this 

 illustrates one of the chief dangers of an educa- 

 tion exclusively in physical science — the exces- 

 sive reliance on authority. 



'Science,' of course, knows no authority, and 

 in the end tests all things. But the indi- 

 vidual man of science, unless he undertakes to 

 repeat the entire investigation, must accept the 

 experimental results of his confreres on author- 

 ity, first satisfying himself, if possible, of the 

 general validity, of the method and the good 

 scientific standing of the investigator. This 

 habit of mind he takes with him to the study 

 of historical and philological questions where 

 (I do not speak of the general public) it is much 

 easier to control an investigation by an appeal 

 to the sources, and where consequently (among 

 trained men) secondary authorities count for 

 less. It would be interesting to illustrate this 

 by the abuse formerly of Lewes' 'Biographical 

 History of Philosophy,' and, since Tyndall's 

 Belfast address, of Lange's clever but one-sided 

 ' History of Materialism. ' But I have already 



