374 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. VIII. No. 194. 



close classification of his philosophy. In general 

 he might be spoken of as a spiritualistic monist, 

 since he finds nothing in the world but the 

 human will and the human will anthropomor- 

 phically projected into space, which projection 

 he follows Schopenhauer in calling force (Kraft), 

 and its localized manifestations energy. But 

 this lightly held monism easily lapses into plu- 

 ralism, and when he gets all his contestants on 

 the arena together a pretty contest they put 

 up. For example, first appears reality as it is 

 in itself— a, ghostly presence. To him enters 

 the burly and self-confident common notion of 

 reality, easily holding all eyes upon himself. 

 Then comes in that keen-witted fellow, interpre- 

 tation of reality, striving to put notion of reality 

 in a hole and get on good terms with reality 

 itself. And this is only a beginning. Even 

 space and time appear to be distinct entities. 

 For, speaking of the production of like effects 

 by like causes, he says very truly that there are 

 no two like causes. At least they must differ in- 

 place and time ; which is very interesting if 

 one thinks of it. 



Then is the author wise in insisting, to the 

 extent we find in the earlier chapters, upon the 

 opposition of experimental science to specula- 

 tive philosophy ? He first gives standing to 

 speculative philosophy by showing how all 

 thinking, even scientific, is speculative, and 

 then adroitly attributes to speculation its old 

 meaning of inquiry into causes, essences and 

 realities. Science is now the servant of specu- 

 lation, or, to use his favorite figure, the hod- 

 carrier bringing bricks and mortar to the 

 philosopher-architect. But how if the hod- 

 carrier chooses to be his own architect, finding 

 that the man of speculation does not feel the 

 properties of the material which he has not en- 

 countered at first hand, and that so his con- 

 struction is not sound. And when reminded 

 that the bricks and mortar of experience are 

 man-made, can he not retort ; but so is the 

 temple ? And may not this suggestion of in- 

 feriority sting him into asking whether any 

 one of this endless succession of temples, fall- 

 ing into ruin almost as soon as built, is really a 

 more noble object than the almost eternal ele- 

 ments of which each one in turn is made ? 



And is not the Doctor wrong in insisting that 



men of science decry speculative philosophy ? 

 They only object to that which is not sober and 

 fruitful. Speculation, indeed ! They all love 

 it as the apple of the eye ! Who does not know 

 that they live on bread and water and wear the 

 hair shirt of inexorable verification to moderate 

 this tendency. Dr. Wagner is right in think- 

 ing that all people have a deep interest in the 

 nature of things, in cause, and necessity, and 

 reality. Who among us is so much a positivist 

 as to say, not only that we have not yet pene- 

 trated the soul of things, but that we never 

 can ; that it would be of no use if we could ; 

 that we ought not even to desire to. The ex- 

 perimental philosopher (if Dr. Wagner will per- 

 mit this hated expression this once) does not 

 travel the noble road of speculative philosophy 

 simply because he has found that for him it is 

 hedged up or leads nowhither. What does Dr. 

 Wagner himself bring back from his search ? 

 Has he found an answer to his questions ? Who 

 has accepted this answer ? AVhile experimental 

 science has been building up a body of knowl- 

 edge which it is a liberal education to know, 

 what sure and well accredited doctrine has 

 speculation to offer ? Where does it impinge 

 upon science ? How help, or illuminate, or di- 

 rect? This is no objection to philosophy, but 

 to its arrogance. 



The chapters upon causality, or rather the 

 law of causality, are suggestive, though not 

 new. If there is some juggling with words 

 here, where is there not in any full discussion 

 of the subject? Every event is both cause and 

 effect ; the emphasis upon every. So the uni- 

 verse is all of a piece ; all events in one series. 

 This implies necessity and excludes accident. 

 But cause in itself is one thing, cause for us an- 

 other. Two events may belong to two, or 

 many, quite different (for us) causal series. 

 The motion of necessity does not exclude the 

 motion of accident. Still there is no absolute 

 accident. Causality has reference to becoming 

 — development — and not to existence ; e.g., to 

 heating, and not to heat ; to vital changes, and 

 not to life. He properly objects to divorcing 

 form from content. If one rubs a glass rod with 

 fur one does not bring about two results — create 

 electricity and electrify the rod — but only one, 

 the latter. 



