September 16, 1898.] 



SCIENCE. 



575 



He follows Liebmann, Analysis of Reality, in 

 asserting that force is not true cause. For ex- 

 ample, force cannot produce motion. But he 

 has in mind Schopenhauer's idea of force, a 

 sort of synthesis of the powers of nature — may 

 one say, the total potential energy of the uni- 

 verse — the thing-in-itself of the metaphysician. 

 True force — always something akin to the hu- 

 man will — is that which releases this funda- 

 mental power, producing the various manifesta- 

 tions of energy. The true cause of the falling 

 of a stone, for example, is not gravity, but the 

 removal of an obstacle ; and so in all motion. 

 This view, sufficiently common in one form or 

 another, may have little significance for physics, 

 which concerns itself with the how and how 

 much rather than the what and why, but is 

 intrinsically important and deserves greater 

 elaboration than it has hitherto received. 



This view leaves no place for matter as some- 

 thing upon which force can act or in which it 

 may 'reside.' The universe is to be explained 

 dynamically. So all talk of atoms and mole- 

 cules, except as for a time they may pictorially 

 assist the learner, is aside from the purpose. 

 They may be handy to have about, as they 

 make no trouble and deny nothing, but they 

 also explain nothing. Ostwald"* concept is the 

 true one, simply putting will for force and acts 

 of will for energy. 



For it is the world of will — of longing, of 

 striving, of action — of which we are conscious. 

 Here is the real world. But the will encounters 

 opposition from without on the part of some- 

 thing which we feel to be akin to the human 

 will — the powers of the external world. The 

 nature of the world is will. 



E. A. Strong. 

 Ypsilanti, Mich. 



International Catalogue of Scientific Literature. 

 Report of the Committee of the Royal So- 

 ciety of London, with Schedules of Classifi- 

 cation. March, 1898. Schedule Q, Anthro- 

 pology. 



It will be remembered that at the Interna- 

 tional Conference for a Catalogue of Scientific 

 Literature, held at London, July, 1896, the 

 classification of the sciences to be catalogued 

 was referred to the Committee of the Royal 



Society for orgauization. The report of this 

 Committee is now published, and it is to its 

 classification of the Science of Anthropology 

 (known as 'Schedule Q') that the present re- 

 view is confined. 



The Committee states that these schedules 

 ' are not put forward as final or authoritative ' 

 (p. 9) ; therefore, an examination of them 

 should be carefully carried out by special 

 workers in science, to see how far a catalogue 

 based upon them will reach the highest degree 

 of usefulness. 



Obviously, the schedule should include all 

 the prominent branches of a science, and should 

 reduce repetition of titles to a minimum. 



With regard to Anthropology the Committee 

 excludes from it the branches of experimental 

 and comparative psychology, grouping these 

 under the general schedule of ' Psychology ' 

 (Schedule P). While the anthropologist may 

 regret this, it is in accordance with the prece- 

 dents of the American Association and other 

 similar bodies. 



The general science of anthropology is di- 

 vided into eleven primai'y branches, as fol- 

 lows : (1) Museums and Collections ; (2) Ar- 

 chseology (prehistoric) ; (3) Anthropometry ; 

 (4) Races ; (5) Industrial Occupations and Ap- 

 pliances ; (6) Arts of Pleasure ; (7) Communi- 

 cation of Ideas ; (8) Science (' chiefly of prim- 

 itive races ') ; (9) Superstition, Religion, Cus- 

 toms ; (10) Administration ; (11) Sociology 

 ('chiefly of primitive races'). The total num- 

 ber of sub-headings is seventy. 



What will first impress the anthropological 

 student in this classification of the subjects of 

 his science are its omissions. Nothing is said 

 of that most prominent branch sometimes called 

 ' developmental somatology,' which investi- 

 gates the influences of heredity and environ- 

 ment and the physical transformations of man 

 (evolution, monogenism, polygenism, etc.) 



The whole science of ethnography, as such, is 

 overlooked, as under the unfortunate heading 

 ' races' the only sub-titles are ' General Works,' 

 ' Classification by Name and Language,' ' Racial 

 Peculiarities. ' Another ill-chosen term is ' arts 

 of pleasure' as a synonym for the fine, or aesthetic 

 arts. Many of the most noteworthy develop- 

 ments of these are in no sense ministers to 



