Decembee 23, 1898.] 



SCIENCE. 



891 



nature has made us, at our present intellec- 

 tual level, evidence is progressive, and can 

 afford no basis for ultimate philosophy. 



Our pre-Cambrian ancestors may have 

 been unable to conceive the negative of 

 many propositions, but what does the ina- 

 bility of a turnip or a sponge to conceive 

 the negative of Newton's laws signify? 

 Or what would our own inability signify if 

 we should sometime find out that the pon- 

 derable matter which makes up what we 

 call ' our universe ' has been sifted out or 

 segregated from other forms of matter by 

 its property of weight ? For no less dis- 

 tinguished an authority than Herschel held 

 that there is proof of the existence of levi- 

 tative matter as well as gravitative matter. 



One volume of Herbert Spencer's ' Phil- 

 osophy ' is devoted to proof that we pri- 

 marily know objects, but to this long 

 argument Berkeley answers : Granted. 

 Most assuredly we primarily know objects, 

 but he tells us that the objects we know 

 primarily are objects of sense. 



So the frozen river of philosophy grinds 

 on, scratching the surface of the everlasting 

 hills, and melting before the genial sun- 

 shine of science, only to receive new accre- 

 tions from the unknown and frozen space 

 beyond the snow-line. 



Some fifteen hundred years have passed 

 since we were told by Proclus that " there 

 are two sorts of philosophers. The one 

 placed body first in the order of beings, 

 and made the faculty of thinking depend 

 thereupon, supposing that the principles of 

 all things are corporeal ; that Bodj^ must 

 really or principally exist, and all other 

 things in a secondary sense, and by virtue 

 of that. Others making all corporeal things 

 to be dependent upon Soul or Mind, think 

 this to exist in the first place and primary 

 sense, and the being of Bodies to be en- 

 tirely derived from and to presuppose that 

 of Mind.* 



* Berkeley, 'Siris,' p. 263. 



While the modern psychologist tells us 

 that there is a third point of view, and that, 

 for all we know to the contrary, both mind 

 and matter may ultimately prove to be 

 phenomenal ; that all mind may be matter 

 in motion, and all matter in motion mind, 

 or at least the raw material of mind, I can- 

 not see why the admission of this possibility 

 compels us to take a side and make a choice; 

 for may we not find a fourth alternative, in 

 a humble confession that, while we do not 

 know what the relation between mind and 

 matter is, we wish to find out? " And, al- 

 though it may, perhaps, seem an uneasy re- 

 flection to some that, when they have taken 

 a circuit through so many refined and unvul- 

 gar notions, they should at last come to 

 think like other men ; yet, methinks, this 

 return to the simple dictates of nature, after 

 having wandered through the wild mazes 

 of philosophy, is not unpleasant. It is like 

 coming home from a long voyage : a man 

 reflects with pleasure on the many difiBcul- 

 ties and perplexities he has passed through, 

 sets his heart at ease, and enjoys himself 

 with more satisfaction for the future." * 



If the antecedents to consciousness are 

 outside consciousness it seems no more 

 than natural that we should be unconscious 

 of them ; and the zoologist who admits that 

 he does not know whether they are or are 

 not all to be found in that part of the uni- 

 verse which may be made manifest to sense 

 does not feel guilty of a threat to the fixed 

 order of nature, or to anything or anybody 

 else. 



There are two reasons why biology and 

 the ' Philosophy of Evolution ' should be as- 

 sociated. 



In the first place, there is a wonderful 

 analogy between the problems of the sen- 

 sible universe and the unfolding of the la- 

 tency of the germ into the potency of the 

 fully developed living being. It is not im- 

 possible that the key to the more specific 



* Berkeley, Preface to ' The Three Dialogues.' 



