June 5, 1903.] 



SCIENCE. 



883 



of their genesis and operations, so that it 

 may be seen how the amount of money 

 originally paid in, or. the value of the 

 assets at any time owned, compares with 

 the par value of all bonds and stocks issued. 

 He expressed doubts as to the soundness 

 of the argument that publicity would pre- 

 vent stock-watering, believing it unproved 

 that the excessive issue of corporate securi- 

 ties was a source of such danger as to ex- 

 cite public alarm. He said he was yet to be 

 convinced that enforced publicity would 

 not be a harmful exercise of public author- 

 ity. 



His remarks were in part as follows: I 

 maintain that the stockholder, as such, is 

 not benefited by corporate publicity, and 

 would be harmed rather than helped by 

 its enforcement. It is one thing for the 

 stockholder to have knowledge of the con- 

 cern whose shares he holds; it is quite 

 another thing to furnish the public the 

 same information. I fail to see that pub- 

 licity can be desirable to the stockholder. 

 The justification for this proposal, there- 

 fore, must be found, if at all, in the theory 

 that the state is charged with the duty of 

 safeguarding the investment of capital in 

 corporate securities. To my mind this is a 

 most serious proposition, and I think we 

 should long hesitate before embarking 

 upon such a paternal venture. Leaving 

 out the speculator and taking into account 

 only those seeking honest investment, ten 

 times more money, to say the least, has 

 been sunk in farm mortgages, suburban 

 lots, patent rights, buying and selling 

 grain, cotton and other commodities, where 

 no corporate shares were dealt in or even 

 existed, than Avas ever lost on account of 

 the fictitious or excessive issue of corporate 

 securities. I can not but regard corporate 

 publicity of the kind and to the extent ad- 

 vocated by many as a certain and serious 

 hindrance to effective competition. Just 



as the Sherman anti-trust law, which is 

 based upon an economic fallacy, has in- 

 directly aided the very results it was de- 

 signed to prevent, so the compulsory dis- 

 closure of all corporate transactions would 

 undermine the competition it was intended 

 to support. Bearing in mind how rapidly 

 all kinds of business are assuming the cor- 

 porate form, that the competition of in- 

 dividuals is fast disappearing, and that 

 competition in the future will be mainly 

 between corporations, it seems plain to me 

 that the enforcement of corporate pub- 

 licity would be an added incentive to in- 

 dustrial combination. Therefore, as I 

 view the matter, the remedy in question 

 will be worthless to the great mass of peo- 

 ple, the consumers, for their troubles are 

 not caused by watered stock and will not be 

 alleviated by publicity. It will not benefit 

 the actual stockholder, for however much 

 he may need information for himself, his 

 interests would not be promoted by bring- 

 ing that information to public knowledge. 

 Against its doubtful and very limited use- 

 fulness to the intending purchaser of cor- 

 porate shares is the danger, not to be 

 lightly estimated, of giving sanction to a 

 principle of extreme paternalism and fur- 

 nishing a fresh impulse, not to compete, 

 but to consolidate. 



The Necessity of Organization among Em- 

 ployers: David M. Parry, president of 

 the National Association of Manufac- 

 turers. 



The great need of the world to-day is 

 organization — organization in every line of 

 human effort. The workers of the land be- 

 gan to organize seventy-five years ago, and 

 although their organizations have been by 

 no means perfect, either as to management 

 or numerical strength, yet they have been 

 able, in consequence of them, to wield much 

 power both with their employers and with 



