MAKCII29, 1895.] 



SCIENCE. 



351 



not at all probable, and 1 means secure, i 

 means indifferent, we might say that such 

 a statement regarding Mars would have a 

 probability perhaps of ^'g . 



The difference between the unscientific 

 and the scientific mind lies in the extent of 

 evidence. The woman who lately left a 

 fund for a prize to the one who shall estab- 

 lish communication with Mars had gathered 

 enough evidence to give, in her mind, a 

 high degree of probability to the supposi- 

 tion of the possibility of such an under- 

 taking. And yet the members of the 

 French Academy who accepted the money 

 in the sense that it should go to the one 

 making the best contribution to our know- 

 ledge of Mars were evidently in possession 

 of enough further evidence to attach a very 

 small degree of probability to the supposi- 

 tion. 



This is the actual work of all the sciences. 

 We cannot and dare not make statements 

 except just so far as warranted by the facts. 

 If you say that the act of discrimination 

 increases the time of thought, the psycholo- 

 gist must answer yes, with a high degree of 

 probability, because carefully collected ex- 

 perimental evidence points that way. If 

 you say that consciousness is continuous 

 during sleep, the psj'chologist must answer 

 that reliable evidence is lacking, and that 

 he is entitled to no opinion either way. 



"We often hear, from philosophers of the 

 old school, the statement that the facts of 

 the universe are divided into classes, each 

 of which is given over to a science for in- 

 vestigation regarding details, while the gen- 

 eral conclusions are reserved for the phil- 

 osophers. 



I must object to the limitation of science 

 to the investigation of individual facts. 

 Many of the problems with which a scien- 

 tist is most directly concerned are the most 

 general of all. The subject of time is one 

 to which the psj'chologist and the astrono- 

 mer devote their special attention. There 



can hardly be anything more general than 

 the great independent variable, as it is 

 called. Likew'ise space forms a problem 

 for geometry, physics and psychology. 



As every scientist knows, an investi- 

 gator in one science is forced to learn a 

 dozen other sciences ; the more he special- 

 izes, the more remotely must he go for his 

 information. For example, the specialist 

 in experimental psychology is obliged to be 

 more or less famiUar with the science of 

 measurement, w'ith the astronomical deter- 

 mination of time, with portions of meteor- 

 ology, with phj'sics, w-ith portions of organic 

 chemistry and physical chemistry, with 

 statistics, ethics, anthropologj^ etc., etc. 

 The meditcval philosopher likes to bottle 

 things up and label them, but the modern 

 sciences are too lively specimens for that 

 process. 



This brings me to the question of the re- 

 lation of science to philosophy. According 

 to Wundt the work of philosophy is to take 

 up and discuss the most general questions, 

 time, space, number, etc., which cannot be 

 handled by the particular sciences. 



But let us consider a moment. Suppose 

 the U. S. Government wishes a report on 

 Lake Tahoe. It would go to the geographer 

 to learn where it is, to the U. S. Survej- to 

 learn its measurements, to the chemist to 

 know its composition, to the meteorologist 

 to inquire about its weather, to the land 

 owners for the price of land, to the boatman 

 to learn the sailing qualities, etc., etc. It 

 would print the reports all side by side for 

 each reader to assimilate as he would or 

 could. What it would not do would be to 

 send out a special agent who should look 

 into these matters himself and make his 

 own report. We verj- well know that such 

 agents filter through more of themselves 

 than of the facts ; they see what they bring 

 eyes to see, and no one can be master of a 

 dozen sciences or trades. 



Suppose, however, it is desired to have a 



