384 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. I. No. 14. 



We are told that the belief that it has, at 

 some time, arisen from the properties of 

 inorganic matter is a logical necessity, but 

 the only logical necessity is that when owx 

 knowledge ends we should confess igno- 

 rance. 



Young men who have been trained in 

 the routine of the laboratory tell us all 

 their interest in biology would be gone if 

 they did not believe all its problems are, in 

 the long run, to be resolved into physics 

 and chemistry. 



The only answer we can give them is 

 that noble work has been done in natural • 

 science by men like Wallace, who believe 

 that life is fundamentally different fi'om 

 matter, and also by men like Haeckel, who 

 believe the opposite. 



They also serve science who only stand 

 and wait, and among them I would wish to 

 be numbered. 



While nothing is gained by giving a 

 name to the unknown agencj'' which is the 

 essence of life, it is better to call it a ' vital 

 principle ' than to deny or ignore its exist- 

 ence. It is better to be called a ' vitalist,' 

 or any other hard name by zealous monists, 

 than to be convicted of teaching, as proved, 

 what we know is not proven. 



The word vitality is as innocent as electricity 

 or gravity; in fact, Newton's use of this 

 word led Leibnitz to charge him with infi- 

 delity to the spirit of science, although no 

 one need fear to follow where Newton leads. 



The older vitalists may have looked on 

 a mere word as an explanation, but the 

 reason the word has fallen into disrepute 

 is the antagonism of the monists to the 

 view that the problem of life presents any 

 peculiar difficulties. 



Many thoughtful men of science have 

 held that the ' faith ' of men like Haeckel 

 ignores many of the data which are fur- 

 nished by our scientific knowledge of the 

 world around us. 



Huxley, in his essay on the Phj^sical 



Basis of Life (1868), says it is necessary 

 for a wise life to be fully possessed of two 

 beliefs : "The first, that the order of nature 

 is ascertainable by our faculties to an ex- 

 tent which is practically unlimited ; the" 

 second, that our volition counts for some- 

 thing as a condition of the course of events. 

 Each of these beliefs can be verified ex- 

 perimentally as often as we like to try." 



Agaia, twenty-five years later (1893), he 

 saj^s (Evolution and Ethics) that, fragile 

 reed as man may be, "there lies witliin 

 him a fund of energy, operating intelli- 

 gentlj'', and so far akin to that which pervades 

 the universe that it is competent to influence and 

 modify the cosmic process." 



Clearly this man of science has no over- 

 whelming dread of the charge of anthro- 

 pomorphism or animism, or of anj' charge 

 except lack of caution. 



I think that he would also admit that 

 everj^ livtag thing contains some small part 

 of this influence which ' counts for some- 

 thing as a condition of the course of events,' 

 and that it must be reckoned with in our 

 attempts at a philosophy of the universe. 

 W. K. Bkooks. 



Johns Hopkins Univeesity. 



The Life and Writings of Constantine Sam^iel 

 Bafinesque. (Filson Club Publications 

 No. 10.) Prepared for the Filson Club 

 and read at its meeting, Mondaj', April 2, 

 1894. By RicHAED Ellsworth Call, 

 M. A., M. Sc, M. D. LouisviUe, Ky., 

 John P. Morton & Co. 1895. 4to. pp. 

 xiii + 227. Portraits, etc. Paper. Price 

 ^2.50, net. 



This sumptuous volume is published bj' a 

 Histoi'ical Club ia LouisviUe, Kentucky, as 

 , a memorial to one of the pioneer naturalists 

 and explorers of the Ohio valley, a man 

 whose brilliant intellect, eccentric character 

 and unhappy fate will always cause his 

 career to be looked upon with interest, and 

 whose nervous and appalling industry has 



