GREECE AND MONTENEGRO 



300 



of the subject Christian peoples in Euro- 

 pean Turkey was in the way of reaHza- 

 tion. 



A 15alkan federation has long been 

 dreamed of, and the first steps toward its 

 attainment were taken some 30 years ago 

 by the then Prime Minister of Greece, 

 Charilao Tricoupis, of whom it is said by 

 the ardent \'enizelists that he was an 

 earlier Venizelos, while the Tricoupists 

 refer to \'enizelos as another Tricoupis. 

 That attempt failed, and for nearly a 

 generation the Balkan entente was rele- 

 gated to the realm of academic discus- 

 sion. 



In the meantime the Turkish policy 

 "Divide and rule" had set the Greeks 

 and Bulgarians at each other's throats, 

 and there had ensued an era of blood in 

 IMacedonia, wherein the province was 

 ravaged by marauding bands of Greeks. 

 Bulgars, and Serbs, who waged a war of 

 extermination against each other. 



This barbarous policy had carried it- 

 self nearly to exhaustion when Venizelos 

 came to power at Athens, and to him it 

 was suggested that an attempt at a def- 

 inite agreement be made among all the 

 nations having racial pretensions in Ma- 

 cedonia and Albania. 



A beginning was made at once, the 

 first exchanges being purely unofficial. 

 It was soon found, however, that formal 

 undertaking were possible, but it was 

 nearly a year before any effort was made 

 to reduce to terms the basis of agree- 

 ment. 



Tllli: MONROE DOCTRINE OF THE BALKANS 



It was thought best to simplify the 

 first declarations, and the same counsel- 

 lor who had first engaged \'enizelos' at- 

 tention to the subject advised that the 

 Allied States should unite in a promulga- 

 tion of a Monroe doctrine for the Balkan 

 States. For this policy the lamented Milo- 

 vanovitch, then Prime ^linister of Servia, 

 became the spokesman, and one of his 

 last — as it was surely the most impor- 

 tant — of his public utterances was a 

 speech in the Skuptchina at Belgrade de- 

 claring the doctrine of the I'alkans for 

 the Balkan peoples. 



Nearlv coincident with this came the 



transfer of Mr. Coromilas from the min- 

 istry of finance at Athens to that for 

 foreign affairs, and the negotiations took 

 an immediate impetus from his active 

 persistence. The early summer saw their 

 completion, and for the first time the 

 Balkan States were in position to present 

 a united front to their traditional enemy. 



The Balkan Federation was not, how- 

 ever, predicated upon immediate war. 

 Greece, at any rate, felt herself unready, 

 The work of national reorganization un~ 

 der \'enizelos' lead was far from com- 

 plete. The finances, to be sure, were in 

 excellent condition. Indeed, Greece alone 

 among the allies had any considerable 

 sum of money on hand when hostilities 

 began. But much remained to be done 

 with the army, and the navy was await- 

 ing the new battleship for which the con- 

 tract had only just been awarded. And, 

 on the whole, the allies preferred a peace- 

 ful solution of the difficulty if it could 

 be had. 



Their fundamental desire was to se- 

 cure tranquillity and good government in 

 Macedonia and Albania, believing that 

 with this the evolution of time would 

 bring to them their natural zones of in- 

 fluence, even as eastern Rumelia had 

 been added to Bulgarian territory. They 

 calculated not a little upon the fetich of 

 the status quo, which had always been 

 before the eyes of the Great Powers, 

 and they reckoned that an eff'ective in- 

 tervention would prevent their coming to 

 grips now. 



A NEW ERA FOR THE NEAR EAST 



Their plan in brief was to mobilize 

 and to present an identical note to the 

 Porte demanding immediate reforms in 

 Macedonia and Albania, at the same time 

 notifying the powers of their action and 

 of the terms of the note. Their expecta- 

 tion was that the powers, fearful of the 

 long-dreaded ex])losion in the Balkans, 

 would then stej) in and enforce the major 

 portion of the demanded reforms. 



It must be admitted that the allies had 

 no considerable confidence in the results 

 of these reforms as administered by 

 Turkish authority, and that they felt that 

 conditions would again be beyond en- 



