July 2, 1886.] 



SCIEN^CE. 



17 



cation which, applied to the latter, constitutes 

 the only practical value that science has for man." 

 The second conception of the social organism en- 

 deavors to correct the eiTor thus pointed out. It 

 recognizes in society a power of self-control. It 

 admits the truth of M. Thiers's sentence, that 

 ' the nation is that being which reflects and deter- 

 mines its own action.' It holds it as useless to stop 

 one's study with a readmg of nature, and refuses 

 to allow that the perfection of human conduct 

 consists in following nature. The jus naturae 

 finds first its true place when subordinated to the 

 jus liominum. 



I do not wish to be drawn from the question in 

 hand to a discussion of the general theory of 

 sociology, but the distinction that has been j)ointed 

 out appears to me essential for a just appreciation 

 of any study whatever that has to do with social 

 relations. It lies back of the theory of both 

 economics and jurisprudence, and points out the 

 manner in which each may exercise an influence 

 on the other. If we adopt the view that the 

 social organism is subject to the same law of de- 

 velopment as a physical organism, our study will 

 be crowned only by negative results. Laissez- 

 faire would then be logical, and the philosophy of 

 anarchy inevitable. But if, on the other hand, 

 we perceive that society may have a conscious 

 purpose, we have discovered a scientific basis for 

 positive and constructive study. We find that no 

 incongi'uity exists in uniting the science and the 

 art of society in the same discipline. The law of 

 evolution, with its ' survival of the fittest ' and its 

 ' adaptation to environment,' comes to be the basis 

 of a scientific theory of revolution or of reforma- 

 tion ; for the fittest type to survive may first exist 

 in the conscious purpose of society, and be real- 

 ized by means of an environment arbiti'arily de- 

 termined. 



This view of social relations leads to certain 

 practical results in the study of economics that 

 cannot be overlooked ; and of these, none is per- 

 haps more important than the new light thrown 

 upon the nature and limitation of legal enact- 

 ments in the process of social growth. The sphere 

 in which law exerts a direct influence is quite 

 restricted, but within that sphere it becomes a 

 most efficient agency. Every change in law 

 means a modification in rights ; and when famil- 

 iar rights are changed, or, what amounts to the 

 same thing, when new duties are imposed, the 

 plane of action for all members of society is ad- 

 justed to a new idea. In many instances legal 

 enactments undertake to enforce certain lines of 

 conduct on a stubborn minority ; but this is not 

 always the case, nor is it the most fruitful assist- 

 ance rendered by law in the realization by society 



of its conscious purposes. As contrasted with 

 this, it may occur that the entire community is in 

 favor of some method of procedure, and yet the 

 practice will be universally disregarded unless 

 granted the sanction of law. This fact, which 

 may at first seem strange, is easily understood 

 when it is noticed that men are more powerfully 

 moved by immediate than by ultimate interests, 

 and that, in the absence of a law which restrains 

 all alike, the fierceness of competition will lead 

 individuals to disregard public opinion, even 

 though they admit the rightness of its commands : 

 for each man says to himself, "If I do not do 

 this thing, which, I confess, is to the permanent 

 injury of society, some one else will ; the evil will 

 be done, and I will lose the personal advantage of 

 the doing of it. But pass a law which restrains 

 alike my neighbor and myself, and I will gladly 

 obey it." That is to say, public opmion considers 

 the social interest ; and with this the individual 

 interest does not always harmonize. The one 

 holds in mind the ultimate, the other the immedi- 

 ate, results ; and the only way in which the social 

 purpose can influence the practice of individtials 

 is for law to establish uniformity of action. 

 This is the most important use of law as an agency 

 of reform. The thought has nothing to do with 

 ' paternal government,' but is in perfect harmony 

 with the idea of democracy. It is the means by 

 which the social organism may realize its con- 

 scious purpose, and it needs no words of mine to 

 show how important is this view of the efficiency 

 of law in matters pertaining to industrial organ- 

 ization. The constructive economist is forced to 

 admit its pertinency. 



But there are other conclusions which spring 

 from this idea of social relations, and which are 

 of especial interest because they touch directly 

 the great economic questions of the day. This is 

 a time when much is heard of industrial re-organ- 

 ization as a means of solving the social problem ; 

 but the lesson taught by the foregoing analysis 

 is, that, in all matters pertaining to re-organiza- 

 tion, it should be held as a first principle to main- 

 tain harmony between the vax'ious parts of the 

 social order. A study of history declares that no 

 part of the social structure may be considered as 

 good or bad in itself. Wliat appears now to be 

 wholly pernicious may once have been capable of 

 complete defence. Most of the evils experienced, 

 so far as they spring from established law or per- 

 manent custom, may be traced to the fact that 

 some right or custom has outlived its time, or that 

 some principle, in itself just, fails to be applied to 

 all departments of social activity. We need not 

 turn tlie pages of history in search of examples 

 of uneven and disjoiaed development : the source 



