16 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. VIII., No. 178 



sued to the exclusion of the other ; at least, the 

 economist must hold ever in view the juridical 

 system of the society vv^ith which he is concerned 

 in order to fully explain the facts he may observe. 



Such statements as the above, however, do not 

 seem to adequately present the views entertained 

 by historical economists. Not only does the jural 

 system influence economic activity, but the theory 

 of jurisprudence at any time accepted has much 

 to do in giving shape and color to the accepted 

 theory of economics. This is not a matter of 

 speculation. It is declared by the history of both 

 jurisprudence and economics during the last one 

 hundred years. It will probably pass without 

 question, that political writers of the last century, 

 whose enthusiasm sprang from a desire for the 

 free exercise of all manly powers, assumed some 

 concei^tion of inalienable rights as the basis of all 

 then- important arguments. 



The rule of authority which they endeavored to 

 shatter was the jus clei ; and it was wholly logical, 

 that, under the direction of such a rule, society 

 should be regarded as a mechanical appliance 

 permanently imposed upon men by some power 

 outside society itself. This idea was shattered by 

 the victory of French philosophy, but this did not 

 go very far in realizing for the men that freedo]n 

 which they sought. Its full effect, indeed, was 

 to supplant the jus clei by the jus naturae ; and 

 though this change may have had decided results, 

 extending iiolitical rights, the new principle adopted 

 exercised as great a tyranny over men's minds as 

 it was ever possible for any conception of a divine 

 arrangement in the affairs of men to exercise. It 

 was this new principle, first well formulated by 

 political philosophers in their criticism upon the 

 existing structure of government and jurispru- 

 dence, this desire to secure some natural law for 

 the conduct of the affairs of men, that gave 

 character to English political economy. English 

 economy, indeed, is but the application of the jus 

 naturae to industrial affairs. Or, to speak of mod- 

 ern economists, the historical school itself is an 

 historical development. The views of this school, 

 says Mr. Ingram, " do not appear to have arisen, 

 like Comte's theory of sociology, out of general 

 philosophical ideas : they seem rather to have 

 been suggested by an extension to the economic 

 field of the conception of the historical school of 

 jurisprudence, of which Savigny was the most 

 eminent representative. The juristic system is 

 not a fixed social phenomenon, but is variable 

 from one stage in the progress of society to 

 another: it is in vital relation with the other 

 co-existent social factors ; and what, in the jural 

 sphere, is adapted to one period of development, 

 is often unfit for another. These ideas were seen 



to be applicable to the economic system also. The 

 relative point of view was thus reached, and the 

 absolute attitude was found to be untenable. 

 Cosmopolitanism in theory, or the assumption of 

 a system equally true of every country, and what 

 has been called perpetualism, or the assumption 

 of a system applicable to every social stage, were 

 alike discredited. And so the German historical 

 school (of economists) appears to have taken its 

 rise." 



But we have not yet arrived at a full statement 

 of the relation that exists between economics and 

 jurisprudence. The modern school of political 

 economy goes further than merely to recognize 

 the existence of such a relation as has been sug- 

 gested above. Having formulated a theory of 

 society in harmony with the teachings of the 

 science of history, the adherents of this school 

 endeavor to bring then- economic doctrines into 

 accord with their social theory. It would be in- 

 correct to claim uniformity of opinion respecting 

 any theory of society. The Germans, in their 

 general discussions, use the word ' state ' as rep- 

 resenting the final analysis of human relations ; 

 English and American writers, when they en- 

 deavor to present German ideas, employ the word 

 ' nation ; ' and perhaps I show the leanings of 

 my own mind in choosing the word 'society.* 

 But whether ' state,' or ' nation,' or ' society,' the 

 fundamental thought is the same. The thing 

 itself brought to view is an organic growth, and 

 not a mechanical arrangement. The springs of 

 its action are not imposed from without, but lie 

 wholly within itself. The law of its own devel- 

 opment is the only permanent and universal fact 

 which its analysis discloses : all other facts are 

 relative truths ; and those systems of thought 

 based upon them, temj)orary systems. 



But there are two ways in which this organism 

 — the state, the nation, society — may be re- 

 garded. It may be regarded as an organism 

 moved by no conscious purpose, and consequently 

 with no control over the course of its own growth ; 

 or it may be conceived as a continuous conscious 

 organism that is capable of placing before itself 

 an ideal structure to be attained. The first con- 

 ception reduces society to the grade of a physical 

 organism. It places social relations under the 

 same law of evolution that is disclosed by a study 

 of the organic world. But, as Mr. Ward truly 

 says, the philosophy of evolution applied in this 

 manner to society becomes sterile, " because, while 

 justly claiming a social science, it falls short of 

 admitting its complete homology with other 

 sciences, and, while demonstrating the tmiformity 

 of social as of physical phenomena, it denies to 

 the former that susceptibility to artificial modifi- 



