104 



SCIENCE. 



[Vol. VIII., No. 182 



1200 and 1400 permanent ? Why has the principle 

 of competition exerted a greater influence since 

 1500 than before? Why in the year 1800 in 

 England was the woollen industry largely con- 

 trolled by journeymen, while in the cotton indus- 

 try the majority of workers had never served an 

 apprenticeship ? If these questions are not legiti- 

 mate ones to put to the economist, I do not know 

 who is to deal with them ; nor do I know how he 

 can answer them except by referring them to the 

 legal structure of society which prevailed at the 

 time considered. For the same reasons, therefore, 

 as were presented above, the lego-historic facts — 

 to borrow a phrase from Lasalle — are material out 

 of which to construct an economic science. It is 

 true that such facts are not permanent, and when 

 we call a truth which rests upon them a final 

 truth, our language must be accepted with limita- 

 tions ; but it is a distinctive feature of the histori- 

 cal school to recognize limitations in periods 

 studied. Its members are not ambitious to cover 

 all times and all peoples with their generalizations, 

 for they well know that such generalizations 

 would be too thin for any use. I have brought 

 this classification prominently into view, because 

 Mr. Hadley insists so strongly that economics " is 

 built out of a few simple laws of human nature," 

 and criticises me for adding to this, as equally 

 necessary for explaining the phenomena of indus- 

 trial society, the physical and legal surroundings 

 of men. The expression used in my former paper 

 must have been loose, or so candid a critic and so 

 clear a thinker would not have thus shot by the 

 mark. And I am inclined to the opinion also that 

 the real difference here brought to view pertains 

 primarily to form of presentation ; its discussion, 

 therefore, would be scholastic rather than schol- 

 arly. 



Still there are certain radical differences between 

 the views expressed or implied in Mr. Hadley's 

 paper and those which I entertain ; and, should 

 circumstances ever render it necessary for me to 

 nail a thesis on his lecture-room door, it would 

 include the following protests. 



I protest, in the first place, against such free and 

 unguarded use of analogy as argument. Because 

 certain things are true in physical science, it does 

 not follow that similar things are true in social 

 science. One may be well versed in the methods 

 of successful investigation in the physical sciences, 

 and yet not possess the mental equipment neces- 

 sary to arrive at truth through the intricacies of 

 social relations. And why ? For two reasons. In 

 the one case, the forces considered are permanent 

 and reliable ; in the other, some of the forces are 

 subject to constant variation. Development of a 

 physical science consists in the discovery of truths 



which are assumed always to have existed, nor 

 has such an assumption so far in our experience 

 proved the source of error. Development of a so- 

 cial science, on the other hand, consists partly in 

 the new discovery of old trulhs, and partly in ob- 

 serving new truths to emerge from the growth of 

 the social organism. If this be true, is it not 

 illogical to rely upon analogy ? Again, the study 

 of physical science is not complicated by the fact 

 that the forces considered have a conscious pur- 

 pose, and, within limits, are self-directing. But 

 in social sciences this is unfortunately the case, at 

 least the theory of social science with which the 

 latest phase of economic science allies itself holds 

 strenuously to the idea of a self-conditioning so- 

 cial organism. In this respect, therefore, analogy 

 fails. 



I protest, in the second place, against the rela- 

 tion that is assumed to exist betw^een the science 

 and the art of economics. It appears to me that 

 they who make most use of these phrases fall also 

 into the error of relying too implicitly upon 

 analogy. What is said of the bearing of a science 

 on an art, which is quite fruitful when applied to 

 a physical science and the art of mechanical in- 

 vention, ceases to have any clear-cut meaning 

 when imputed to social relations. The reason is, 

 that what is termed ' the art of economics ' is 

 itself one of the elements which must be admitted 

 by the ' science of economics ' in order to explain 

 the laws of its own development. If this be true 

 (and it must be admitted if society is an organism 

 of conscious purpose), there is no such sharp line 

 of distinction between the science and the art of 

 economics as has been commonly supposed. With- 

 out denying an element of truth to what Mr. Mill 

 so admirably states in the last book of his ' Logic,' 

 I still insist that it is preferable to speak of a 

 science of economics which is at the same time 

 analytic and constructive. 



I protest, in the third place, against the use of 

 the astronomical method of investigation in the 

 social sciences. Should my readers deske to know 

 in what this method consists more perfectly than 

 may be learned from Mr. Hadley's paper, 

 they will find it presented at length in Cairnes's 

 ' Logical method of political economy.' Indeed, 

 that book might well be termed a handbook for 

 the use of students in economic observatories. 

 The method, in short, consists in this : to build 

 a system of thought on the assumption that a cer- 

 tain line is straight, and then to take a squint to 

 see how crooked it is. I would not, of course, 

 deny that this method is, in itself considered, 

 logical, nor that it is fruitful when employed in as- 

 tronomy : my only objection is, that in economics 

 it is of no sort of use. It has not led to a single 



