November 13, 1886.] 



SCIEJSrCE, 



443 



That there is no contradiction between theism and 

 evolution our author clearly shows. But he goes 

 even further than this, and claims to prove that 

 evolution is radically inconsistent with atheism. 

 He thinks that the two thoughts, when carried to 

 legitimate extremes, lead to suicidal contradic- 

 tions ; leading, in fact, to the extremes of Comp- 

 tism, and its necessary worship of human nature 

 as the loftiest thing in existence. Now, whatever 

 may be said of this discussion, it is plain that the 

 reader's judgment of this part of the work will 

 depend largely upon his willingness to accept the 

 conclusion. If he reads with a predisposition 

 against the conclusion, the whole argument will 

 be regarded with the same indifference as are all 

 other arguments which try to prove the existence 

 of Goii. But if he reads, accepting the conclu- 

 sion, and wishing to find a justification for a 

 belief in theism, he will be abundantly satisfied ; 

 for the arguments are keen and forcible, and 

 plainly show that theism is exalted by the concep- 

 tions of evolution. 



In his attempt to refute Spencer, our author has 

 not been quite so successful. To refute such a 

 system of philosophy as that of Spencer is as 

 difficult as to demonstrate it. It may be easy to 

 criticise Spencer, to show his false deductions and 

 an amount of inconsistency in his writings. This 

 our author has succeeded in doing well enough. 

 But to refute his philosophy is a different matter. 

 An examination of this criticism shows that it is 

 chiefly upon Spencer's ideas of primal cause, and 

 therefore upon his conception of the significance 

 of law, and not at all upon his theory as to the 

 development of the visible universe. Our author 

 first shows that Spencer's philosophy is one of 

 involution, and not evolution, — a fact which 

 Spencer himself recognized. Our author gives a 

 definition of evolution which completely reverses 

 that of Spencer. He makes it a passage from the 

 complex to the simple, rather than from the simple 

 to the complex. Wiiat he means by this is not 

 that nature has not seemed to grow more complex, 

 but that thio growth has been only the unfolding 

 of forces and tendencies which have existed from 

 the beginning. Evolution is therefore a revealing 

 of that which is hidden, and is thus really a sim- 

 plification. An egg is more complex than the 

 adult, since, though seemingly simple, it contains 

 in a small space, in addition to that which we can 

 see, forces and tendencies which regulate the 

 growth of the adult. Its development is simply 

 the unfolding of this potentiality. And so the 

 original nebula was really infinitely complex, since 

 it contained in its laws and tendencies the possi- 

 bility of the system which has arisen from it. 

 This, our author claims, is in direct contradiction 



to Spencer's philosophy of a passage from the 

 simple to the complex, and this philosophy is 

 therefore false at its foundation. It is a restate- 

 ment of the old saying that evolution cannot ex- 

 ceed involution. Now, in reality, our author and 

 Spencer do not disagree so much as at first seems. 

 Spencer has only attempted to explain the visible 

 universe by his philosophy, recognizing his in- 

 ability to explain or comprehend law. In the 

 visible universe there has undoubtedly been an 

 increase in complexity. Spencer would not for an 

 instant deny that the original nebula contained in 

 its laws and tendencies the potential system. The 

 difference between our author and Spencer is thus 

 only in their metaphysical conception of the sig- 

 nificance of these laws and their relation to the 

 first cause which lies beneath them. It is the 

 difference between theism and agnosticism again. 

 Spencer regards the universe as without design : 

 our author regards the working of law as the un- 

 folding of a plan. Spencer looks upon the seem- 

 ing design in nature as resulting from the natural 

 working of law, without attempting to go beneath 

 this statement : our author goes a step further, 

 and puts the plan in the nature of the laws them- 

 selves. These two positions are not necessarily 

 contradictory, though when reg;\rded in certain 

 lights they may be so. 



This discussion of Mr. Rred's is therefore valu- 

 able as an exposition of the meaning of theistic 

 evolution. It shows that theistic evolution is con- 

 sistent with all the facts of science, and that the 

 law of evolution, when viewed from the theistic 

 stand-point, contains a significance which is utterly 

 wanting to it when regarded from the stand-point 

 of atheism. But as a refutation of Spencer it is 

 hardly a success ; for it has only shown that the 

 conception of Spencer's Unknowable as an intelli- 

 gent personality is preferable to the agnostic 

 position of Spencer. 



TWO SCHOOL-BOOKS ON GEOLOGY. 

 There can hardly be found a greater contrast in 

 the methods of treatment of a subject than is pre- 

 sented by a comparison of the school-books on 

 geology lately prepared by Professors Geikie and 

 Winchell. The authors seem to have had scholars 

 of about the same high-school age in mind. Their 

 objects are similar, — for one makes ' an appeal 

 to the powers of observation,' and the other wishes 

 ' to foster a habit of observation,' — and yet how 

 different are their paths to this common end ! 

 Professor Winchell begins, after advising teachers 



Class-book of geology. By Archibald Geikie. London, 

 Macmillan, 1886. 8°. 



Geological studies ; or. Elements of geology. By Alex- 

 ander Winchell. Chicago, Griggs, 1886. 8°. 



