52 Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts, and Letters. 



exceedingly ambiguous one. Not to speak of its various second- 

 ary and metaphorical uses, it is employed in two important and 

 totally distinct senses. In a purely legal point of view, it is the 

 right or title to a thing — ownership. But in the more common 

 and popular sense, and the one in which alone political economy 

 is concerned about it, it is a tangible entity — the thing owned — 

 that upon which the claim is based — that in which the right or 

 title inheres. In this sense there is no difiFerence between property 

 and wealth. " The test of property," say Professor Perry, " is 

 a sale ; that which will bring something when exposed for ex- 

 change is property; that which will bring nothing, either never 

 was, or has now ceased to be, distinctively property." But Pro- 

 fessor Perry holds that credits, rights, claims, are property ; that 

 property is or may be capital, and that all capital is wealth. It 

 seems to me there is a fallacy here, and that it lies in considering 

 that what are bought and sold, are mere rights and claims, separate 

 and distinct from the entities in which the rights inhere, and to 

 which the claims attach. Strike the property out of existence 

 upon which a claim rests, and the claim disappears with it. De- 

 stroy a man's claim, on the other hand, or all evidences of it, and 

 the property remains — the ownership simply changes hands. 



If titles are property in the sense of wealth, it would seem that 

 a community has an easy road to fortune. Its farms and other 

 real estate are wealth ; they need only be mortgaged to create as 

 much new wealth in the form of personal property. If mere 

 titles are property, then the wealth of the nation or, is you please, 

 of the individuals of the nation, may at least be doubled without 

 any appreciable expenditure of time or labor. The truth is, 

 wealth is something valuable and which has become so through 

 the application of labor, and a title to it, or a claim upon it, or a 

 representation of it, can no more be wealth than a shadow can be 

 substance. 



The notion that titles and claims are property finds ample ex- 

 pression in tax-laws. Few countries afford better opportunities for 

 testing methods of taxation than our own, but none certainly can 

 exhibit such an array of incongruities. The ease with which 

 ])roperty is accumulated makes us less considerate of expenditures 



