?50 



SCIENCE. 



[N. S. Vol. V. No. 113. 



distinguish between ' objective' and 'subjective' 

 ScheinthdHgkeit (312). The biological criterion 

 of definite instinctive character might be in- 

 voked in the former class, and the psychologi- 

 cal criterion in the other. And we would then 

 have a situation which is exemplified in many 

 other functions of animal and human life — func- 

 tions which are both biological and instinctive, 

 and also psychological and intelligent, as sym- 

 pathy, fear, bashfulness. Then, of course, the 

 further question comes up as to which of these 

 forms is primary, again the old question as to 

 whether intelligence arose out of reflexes or the 

 reverse. 



I think some light falls on this time-honored 

 question from the statement of it in connection 

 with this new question of play, and especially 

 when we remember Herr Groos' theory of the 

 function of imitation and the extension of his 

 view suggested above. If imitation stands 

 midway between instinct and intelligence, both 

 furthering the growth of instinct, and also 

 leading to its decay in the presence of intelli- 

 gence, then we might hold something like this: 

 In proportion as an action loses its consciously 

 imitative and volitional character, to that de- 

 gree it loses its Schein character, and becomes 

 real in consciousness and instinctive in perform- 

 ance (and this applies to the cases in which imita- 

 tion has itself become habitual and instinctive); 

 and on the contrary, in proportion as an instinc- 

 tive action is modified and adapted through imi- 

 tation and intelligence, to that degree it becomes 

 capable of assuming the Schein character and is 

 indulged in as conscious play. I cannot enlarge 

 upon this here, but it seems to square with a 

 good many of the facts, both those which Groos 

 cites as showing that imitation opens the way 

 for the decay of instinct with the growth of in- 

 telligence, and those which Morgan and I have 

 cited as showing that imitation keeps congenital 

 variations alive and so allows them to accumu- 

 late into instincts. And I think it so far con- 

 firms the view that imitation is a sort of meet- 

 ing point of race habit, represented by instinct, 

 and race accommodation, represented by intel- 

 ligence — just the double function which imita- 

 tion serves also in the development of the in- 

 dividual [Cf. My volume on Mental Develop- 

 ment, in loc). 



Going into the analysis of the play psychosis, 

 Herr Groos finds several sources of pleasure to 

 the animal in it (203 ff): pleasure of satisfying 

 an instinct, pleasure of movement and ener- 

 getic action, but, most of all, 'pleasure in being 

 a cause. ' This last, together with the ' pleasure 

 in experimenting,' which characterizes many 

 play activities, is urged with great insistence. 

 Even the imitative function is said to produce 

 the joy of 'victory over obstacles.' Yet, here 

 again, the author is compelled to draw the dis- 

 tinction between the play which is psycholog- 

 ical enough to have a represented object, and 

 the instinctive sort in which the pleasure is 

 only that of the instinct's own performance. 

 The pleasure of overcoming friction of move- 

 ment, also, is very doubtful, since in any but 

 the instinctive games which are cited (Chapter 

 I.) to prove that the animal is not using up 

 surplus energy (seeing that he plays after he is 

 tired) — in other games we stop playing when 

 the friction and inertia of the muscles become 

 conscious as fatigue. Much more, however, is 

 to be said for the pleasure of rivalry, or of 

 overcoming an opponent, in the higher types 

 of play; but Herr Groos scarcely does this 

 justice. 



Returning to the element of illusion in play, 

 we find two ingredients in it (313 if): a divis- 

 ion of consciousness {Spaltimg des Beivusstseins), 

 i. e., a, division between the activity treated as 

 real and the sense that it is unreal. There is 

 considerable oscillation between these two poles. 

 This ability to treat representations as realities 

 is, according to Herr Groos, the essential of all 

 imagination. In play it is akin to the division 

 of consciousness found in certain pathological 

 cases of double personality. It is a sort of 

 hypnotization by the stream of representa- 

 tions, but with the sense that it is all an illu- 

 sion and may be pierced through by a return 

 to reality at any moment. This seems to me a 

 true and valuable characterization of the play 

 consciousness (it is taken from K. Lange), but 

 Professor Groos' extension of it to all imagina- 

 tion does not seem to hold. In his criticisms 

 of others (as the present writer) he fails to 

 honor the current distinction between ' fancy ' 

 and 'constructive imagination.' In fancy we 

 do yield ourselves up to a play of images, but 



