2 74 



SCIENCE 



[Vol. XXI. No. 537 



Romans called this jus enter gentes, the French denominate it 

 droit des gens, the Spaniards call it derecho de gentes, and we, for 

 lack of a more speciSc term, call it international law. But law 

 it is not; and, besides, if we admit the term at all, "law of na- 

 tions" and "international law" are certainly not equivalents. 

 The one implies an impossible condition of things, the other, 

 though more approximately correct, would be more accurately 

 described as international ethics or morality. 



Furthermore, we are in the habit of describing what we call 

 " international law" as "the natural law of individuals applied 

 to nations," and when we are asked what this "natural law of 

 individuals" may be, we reply readily that it is " the law of nature 

 applied to moral actions," and that it consists of "rules which 

 are common to all mankind," quite independent of the accidents 

 of time, place, and circumstance. Now, this is little else than 

 mere words without any definite import, for in reality there are 

 not, and never have been, any such "rules." There is not asingle, 

 universal, fixed " rule " of human conduct which all men of all 

 ages and countries have recognized in practice; there is no uni- 

 form moral code, written or unwritten, which peoples of all 

 countries have even professed to obey. 



But, we are told, there are certain "principles of justice, dis- 

 coverable by right reason and established by usage," which ought 

 to regulate the mutual relations of nations. But who shall ac- 

 curately define "justice," and who shall give us an authentic 

 standard of " right reason?" Public opinion in each sovereign 

 state establishes a criterion of justice which rises no higher than 

 the intellectual development or civilization of the people of that 

 particular state; and what the people of one may consider "right 

 reason " is often deemed wrong reason by those of another. Thus 

 some regard all moral distinctions as merely conventional, others 

 believe moral distinctions to have been " written in the heart of 

 man by the finger of God." Most Christian peoples believe, or at 

 least believe they believe, there is "a positive law, audible in 

 conscience, which enjoins certain actions and forbids others," 

 according to their respective suitableness or repugnance to the 

 social nature of man. Others believe that conscience itself is 

 merely the result of education and environment, consequently 

 that there cannot be, in the very nature of the case, any positive 

 moral standard. No matter how it originated, I presume that 

 most people will agree that what we call "conscience" is nothing 

 more than that faculty of the mind which takes cognizance of its 

 own thoughts; that, even in the most latitudinal sense, the term 

 can imply no more than a moral standard of action in the mind, 

 and that this standard is always relative, that is, high or low, 

 according to the degree of intellectual development. 



We are in the habit of evading the consequences of these propo- 

 sitions by assuming, first, that moral distinctions have had eternal 

 existence in the mind of the Creator, which never changes; and, 

 second, that to Christian peoples only have been revealed the will 

 of God. This would limit what we call "international law" to 

 Europeans and their descendants on this continent; and it, more- 

 over, assumes as a fact that, in our international relations we are 

 governed by rules which, in their very nature, are unchangeable, 

 which is absurb. For, reason about it as we may, we cannot get 

 rid of the fact that our standard of morality is progressive, and 

 therefore ever changing. There is always an advance from lower 

 to higher conceptions of humanity and justice, and corresponding 

 changes in public sentiment as to what is right and expedient in 

 our international relations. The general concensus of the Chris- 

 tian world touching the abstract propositions of right and wrong 

 is not what it was even one short century ago, and a century 

 hence it will not be exactly what it is to-day. The time was 

 when the most enlightened nations, including the one through 

 which was derived our form of religion, spared neither age nor 

 sex in battle. Later on, they spared non-combatants, but put all 

 prisoners to death. Further on, the lives of prisoners were spared, 

 but they were reduced to slavery. As civilization advanced, 

 prisoners of war were ransomed by the payment of money or its 

 equivalent. Finally, they were put on parole and regularly ex- 

 changed. Not many centuries ago. Christian nations went to war 

 for the avowed purposes of conquest and selfish aggrandisement. 

 After this, war was still held to be justifiable if waged for the 



declared purpose of opening new avenues of trade. Later on, 

 war could be justified only on grounds of reasonable apprehension 

 for national safety, or for the vindication of national honor. 

 Perhaps the time is not very remote when Christian peoples will 

 realize that there is a higher method of settling international dis- 

 putes than that adopted by the ants and beetles, and then the 

 principle of arbitration will be universally accepted. 



Hitherto, what we call our international law has been deemed in- 

 applicable to pagan nations and savage tribes, and in our dealings 

 with both we have not ahva.ys been governed by our own rules of 

 justice. Our apology for this has been the assumption that such 

 peoples are not themselves governed by the rules of justice which 

 we acknowledge. But, if we are subject to a system of ethics 

 which we profess to believe of divine origin, is not that, of itself, 

 an all-suBScient reason for not departing from it in our dealings 

 with other than professedly Christian peoples? It would seem 

 that, if we are more than a community of hypocrites, our rela- 

 tions with the indigenous peoples of this continent ought to have 

 taught us this wholesome lesson long ago. 



To sum up, then, our so-called international law is but public 

 opinion sanctioned by usage among those who call themselves 

 Christians. But this public opinion necessarily changes with the 

 progressive stages of intellectual development. Therefore it is 

 not, and cannot be, a " fixed rule " of conduct in the reciprocal 

 relations of nations. We err in calling it a " science," because 

 our conceptions of its fundamental principles are neither clearly 

 defined nor easily referable to known facts. And we err in limit- 

 ing its application to so-called Christian nations, because we 

 thereby contradict our professions and impair confidence in our 

 sincerity. 



BRITISH STONE CIRCLES.— II. STONEHENGE.' 



, BT A. ,L. LEWIS, LONDON, ENSLAND. 



If the circles at Abury (or Avebury) claim the first notice on 

 account of their great superiority in size above all others, Stone- 

 henge naturally, and for many reasons, takes the next place to 

 them. Stonehenge is eighteen miles south of Abury ; the nearest 

 town to it is Amesbury (three miles), but as Amesbury is not on 

 any line of railwa,y, Salisbury (Great Western or South Western 

 railways) is the most convenient place from which to visit it; 

 the distance is eight miles, six by road and two across the plain 

 after leaving the road, and there is now no refreshment house on 

 the way. The British entrenched hill, on which the Roman, 

 Saxon, and Norman city stood, and which, under the title of Old 

 Sarum, returned representatives to Parliament till 1832, at which 

 time it was uninhabited, will attract notice, and may be visited 

 either in going or returning. 



The outer circle at Stonehenge is 100 feet in diameter, and if 

 it were ever completed (which is a point in dispute) consisted of 

 30 stones, averaging 13| feet in height; they were -roughly 

 squared and had two knobs or bosses worked on the top of each, 

 and they were connected by smaller stones, each of which had a 

 hole at each end, made to fit on the knobs of the upright stones 

 on which it rested; these arrangements are found in no other 

 circle, and are of themselves sufficient to render Stonehenge 

 perfectly unique. One stone of this circle, still standing in its 

 place, is shorter and slighter than the others, and this has led to 

 doubts as to whether the outer circle were ever complete. Inside 

 the outer circle were, first, a circle of small stones, the original 

 number of which is uncertain, and, second, inside these five 

 trilithons or groups of three stones, two upright and one connect- 

 ing their tops, these capstones, like those of the outer circle, were 

 kept in their places by holes fitting on knobs cut on the tops of 

 the uprights, but while each upright of the outer circle had two 

 knobs, and the chain of capstones was continuous, the uprights 

 of the trilithons had but one knob each, and each pair of uprights 

 with its capstone was separate from its neighbor; these trilithons 

 were arranged in the form of a horseshoe, the highest (of which 

 the uprights were 33 feet above ground) being in the centre, and 

 the opening of the horseshoe, which is 44 feet wide, being toward 

 the northeast. Inside this horseshoe of trilithons was a horseshoe 

 ^ No. I , Abury, appeared in No. 529, March 24. 



