UNITED STATES SOVEREIGKTT. 127 



First, the power that performed the act of severance was the 

 Continental Congress. But by what authority, and in virtue of 

 what delegation of power did the Continental Congress act? Was 

 the Congress the organ of the several States, or of the '* people at 

 large" (to use Mr. Marsh's expression)?* To answer this question, 

 which rests at the bottom of the argument, we must trace briefly 

 the history of this Congress. 



In the year 1764, npon motion of James Otis, the General Court 

 of Massachusetts passed a resolution proposing to the other colo- 

 nies to form a union for the purpose of resisting the acts of the 

 British government. This proposition was accepted, first by Vir- 

 ginia, then by the other colonies. The Congress met the next 

 year (1765), and shortly afterward, as a result of the spirit thus 

 manifested, the Stamp Act was repealed. The Second Continental 

 Congress met in 1774, called in a precisely similar manner. In 

 both cases the members of the Congress were elected by the several 

 colonies, and in both cases it was only a portion of the colonies — 

 nine the first time, twelve the second — that were represented. Now 

 so long as Georgia staid away, it is clear that not " the people at 

 large of the United States," but only the people of twelve colonies, 

 were engaged in formal acts of resistance. In the assembly thus 

 composed of delegates from the several colonies, the colonies voted 

 as stick; no measure was adopted by a majority of votes, as would 

 have been the case if they had been considered to represent the 

 people at large; a majority of the co?ow?es must always decide. It 

 was by colonies that the Declaration of Independence was passed, 

 and in this document the several colonies are declared to be "free 

 and independent States." 



Let us pause a moment upon this word " State," which thus 

 makes its appearance in our political vocabulary. The great con- 

 venience of having a diflerent term to denote the units which com- 

 pose our federal government from that which designates the federal 

 government itself, has established, in American constitutional law, 

 a fundamental difference in the meaning of the respective terras. 

 By State we understand a political organization inferior to the Naticn. 

 But this distinction is peculiar to American public law. The two 

 terms are originally identical in meaning, or rather in application; 

 being applied indifferently to the same object, but from different 

 ■* The Nation, No. 23. 



