198 WISCONSIN ACADEMY SCIENCES, ARTS, AND LETTERS. 



. "Complete generalization is complete knowledge " not because 

 the generalization contains the potential attributes necessary to 

 constitute individualities, but because it is the generaliza- 

 tion stripped of its individualizing attributes. The indi- 

 vidual must exist before the genus, there can be no generaliza- 

 tion unless there be a preceding individualization. The individ- 

 ual is lost in the species, the species in the genus, the genus in the 

 order, the order in the class, and the class in the kingdom. The 

 two kingdoms, vegetable and animal, have properties in common 

 which classify them as organic. Organic and inorganic bodies hav^ 

 elements in common which unite theiu under the head of matter. 

 Matter has weight and density and dimension; if we rise in our 

 generalization we must in some measure eliminate these properties 

 — these individualities. In order to do this we conceive of matter 

 reduced to a state of the greatest rarity — as filling all space — as be- 

 ing, in fact, a homogeneous, illimitable, imponderable, chaotic mass. 

 But let our conceptions be at their best we must still think of mat- 

 ter as having limits, elements and a degree of density. Our high- 

 est generalization is reached when we think of matter as existing 

 in this nebulous state. 



Now, conceive a Supreme Intelligence, and what is the effect in 

 our mind? Immediately, our conceptions from being most indis- 

 tinct and general, are concentrated upon one object having many 

 attributes. For we cannot think of intelligence apart from mmd, 

 of mind apart from body, of body apart from members and of mem- 

 bers apart from functions. In what sense then can the Supreme 

 Intelligence be considered the '"'' highest generalization," surely not 

 in a logical one, for instead of widening our generalization it nar- 

 rows it. Following the strict rules of inductive reasoning we must 

 stop with nebulous matter. A Supreme Intelligence is not a higher 

 generalization. If sought by reason at all it must be ieleologically 

 and not by the rules of induction. 



Assuming, however, that the Supreme Intelligence exists and that 

 it is absolutely the highest generalization possible, are we to con- 

 sider it as a generalization containing potential individualizations, 

 or as a generalization stripped of its individualizing attributes? It 

 is evident from Dr. Carpenter's reasoning that he considers it the 

 former, whereas, if it could be reached by a process of inductive 

 reasoning, as he assumes, it is equally evident that it would be the 



