July 24, 1896.] 



SCIENCE. 



93 



the stimulus of a nerve ceases to be moder- 

 ate and agreeable and becomes excessive 

 and painful cannot be determined with pre- 

 cision, for a stimulation which is moderate 

 for one individual will be excessive for an- 

 other or for the same individual at a differ- 

 ent time. The strong alcoholic liquor, for 

 instance, which pleasantly titillates the 

 throat of a drunkard, will sear the delicate 

 mucous membrane of the child unaccus- 

 tomed to its use. 



Having thus arrived at a definition of 

 pain and noted that the phenomenon in 

 man and the lower animals is similar in 

 kind though vastly different in degree, we 

 recur to the original question : Have we a 

 right, in studying the phenomena of life, to 

 inflict upon animals whatever pain may be 

 necessary for the attainment of our object? 

 This leads us to consider the broader ques- 

 tion, how far it is right that one individual 

 should suffer for the good of another; and 

 this again involves the still broader prob- 

 lem, how far the prospect of future good 

 may compensate for present evil. A full 

 discussion of these questions would carry 

 us far beyond the limits of this discourse. 

 For our present purpose it will be sufficient 

 to note the fact that we unhesitatingly sub- 

 mit ourselves and subject those we love to 

 physical suffering for the sake of future 

 benefit which we think will outweigh the 

 present pain. Nor is this deliberate choice 

 of present evil for the sake of future good 

 limited to those cases in which the evil and 

 the good are both experienced by the same 

 individual. The law of vicarious suffering, 

 by which pain to one individual secures 

 pleasure to another, is a law from whose 

 operation we cannot escape if we would, 

 and, however much we may at times rebel 

 against it, a calm consideration forces us to 

 recognize its stern beneficence. The law 

 which bids us bear one another's burdens, 

 and that which declares that the sins of the 

 fathers shall be visited upon the children, 



tend powerfully to bind the human race to- 

 gether and contribute perhaps more than 

 any other causes to the development of the 

 moral sense. We see then that there is 

 nothing repugnant to our moral feelings in 

 the abstract idea that one individual should 

 suffer for the benefit of another, and if we 

 accept this principle, as indeed we must^ 

 when applied to two individuals belonging 

 to the highest grade of sentient creatures, 

 there is still less reason for rejecting it 

 when the suffering individual belongs to a 

 lower grade than the individual who is 

 benefited, since, for the reasons already 

 given, the suffering, in this case, bears a 

 mailer proportion to the benefits obtained 

 than when both individuals are equally 

 highly organized. Moreover, when the 

 sufferings of the lower animals have, as a 

 result, not a benefit to a single individual 

 but an increase of human knowledge, the 

 disproportion between the suffering and the 

 benefit becomes practically infinite, for the 

 suffering remains a constant quantity, while 

 the benefit, since it accrues to the whole 

 human race and through all time, is multi- 

 plied by an infinite factor. 



Admitting, then, that there is no abstract 

 reason why animals should not suffer for 

 the benefit of man, it remains to be consid- 

 ered whether we have a '■ right to constitute 

 ourselves administrators of this law of 

 vicarious suffering and to apply it to ani- 

 mals for our own interest.' The right of 

 man to infiict pain upon the lower animals 

 for his own benefit has never been very dis- 

 tinctly formulated. Our relations to the 

 wild denizens of the forest, field and stream 

 are very largely an inheritance from those 

 times when our savage ancestors disputed 

 with the lower animals for the right to exist 

 on the face of the earth. In fact, they do 

 not differ materially, except in degree of 

 complication, from the relation of the lion 

 to the lamb or the hawk to the dove. 



In the words of the author of the above 



