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A RECENT ANALYSIS OF WILL/ 



The promise made by Professor Baldwin in the preface to 

 his first "'Handbook"" lias been fulfilled. The expectation 

 aroused by this promise has perhaps been more than gratified 

 since in the "Psychology of Peeling and Will" we have 

 the same rigorous scientific treatment whi-.-h characterized 

 the former volume, applied to subject matter which, for rea- 

 sons now known to be suicidal, has been worked over for 

 college text-books with far less care and satisfaction than the 

 strictly intellectual operations. It must be a source of con- 

 gratulation to teachers of psychology to know that we are 

 now having given us year by year psychologies which deal 

 with the stubborn complexities of mind from a standpoint 

 that bids fair to give us soon, if it has not done so already, a 

 veritable "New Psychology." " 



Taking the old method at its true worth and retaining the 

 sum-total of valuable results it has given, it is still evident 

 that the "natural science point of view" has been so fruit- 

 ful in its construction of psychological data, has so modified 

 old conceptions, has in fact so changed the whole face of 

 psychological procedure, that nothing short of "New Psy- 

 chology " can briefly characterize these consequences. The 

 volumes of both James and Baldwin will, however, have 

 their real value for teachers, not only as psychology, but as 

 affording an ordered body of scientifically determined laws 

 necessary for anything like fruitful philosophical construc- 

 tion. The data of philosophy must come from science as 

 positive, and the scientific data given up by psychology are, 

 it is clear, peculiarly valuable as a contribution to the con- 

 ditions necessary for serious philosophizing. Rational inter- 

 pretation, aided by "the judicious use of hypotheses," is 

 necessary to complete the full survey of mind, but presup- 

 poses, if it is to be of genuine worth, previous empirical in- 

 vestigation. Upon such investigation is based " the possi- 



1 " Handbook of Psychology : Feeling and Will," by James Mark Baldwin. 

 Henry Holt & Co., New York. 



2 '* Senses and Intellect." 



bility of a psychology, which is not a metaphysics, nor even 

 a philosophy." 



Written under this conception is Professor Baldwin's 

 "Handbook." It is replete, however, wiih latent sugges- 

 tions which take one immediately over into the philosophical 

 field. Such suggestions when formally stated are to be found 

 in the small print, which immediately follows the strictly 

 psychological analysis and discussion. " 



Peculiarly rich in suggestion for ethical construction has 

 seemed to me the author's discussion of "Will," and I de- 

 sire, in brief review, to dissect out of the body of the analy- 

 sis the facts which have ultimate bearing on the question of 

 "Freedom." For whether solvable or insolvable in any 

 ultimate sense on psychological grounds every one must ad- 

 mit that the weapons of analysis whereby the complex proh- 

 lem of " Free-Will " may be reduced to intelligible form are 

 in the hands of psychology. Even if we reach no satisfac- 

 tory solution, it is at least a gain to know clearly what the 

 elements of the problem are. It is natural enough, there- 

 fore, that with every attempt to throw new light on the un- 

 derlying elements of volition, the old sore of freedom should 

 be reopened. As long as philosophy has life, an acknowl- 

 edged fixndamental question cannot remain passively unset- 

 tled ; philosophy cannot be held in check by external prohi- 

 bition; it moves with an inner life of its own. 



Sidgwick recognizes this in his return to the question of 

 freedom,^ claiming, as he does, that, although "complete 

 mutual understanding will never be reached until we have 

 reached complete confutation of fundamental errors," yet 

 "a diminution of the amount of misunderstanding . . . 

 especially on fundamental points," is an end in itself worth 

 striving for. What Professor Baldwin's discussion has ac- 

 complished in the interests of this desideratum of diminished 

 misunderstanding, let us see. 



Chapters xii. and xiii. discuss, under the general title of 

 the " Motor Aspects of Sensuous Feeling," first, "the motor 

 consciousness; second, the 'stimuli,' to involuntary move- 

 ment." As a fundamental lavF of the motor consciousness 

 we have stated what is called the law of mental dynamo- 

 genesis, viz., " that every state of consciousness tends to 

 realize itself in an appropriate muscular movement." The 

 general conclusion reached on the reactive consciousness is 

 that this "consciousness, per se, is simply consciousness of 

 nervous reactions and memories of such reactions or of their 

 elements. As far as there is a consciousness of self in reflex 

 attention, it is an objective felt self rather than a subjec- 

 tive feeling active self. Whatever ground may be found 

 subsequently for such an active executive self, we find no 

 such ground here" (pp. 293-4). This conclusion is corrobo- 

 rated by a reference to certain well-known hypnotic phe- 

 nomena in which power of choice is wanting and the con- 

 sciousness of the patient becomes entirely reactive. 



Stimuli to invo]untary movement are next analyzed and 

 discussed. "By stimulus is meant the affective experience 

 of any kind which tends to issue in conscious motor reaction " 

 (p. 295). Such stimuli fall under one or the other of two 

 great classes: (1) organic, (2) extra organic. In this con- 

 nection (p. 204) is found the differentiation of stimuli as 

 impulsive or instinctive. Sensuous impulse is " the original 

 tendency of consciousness to express itself in motor terms as 

 far as this tendency exists apart from particular stimula- 

 tions of sense" (p. 307). On the other hand, "instincts are 

 original tendencies of consciousness to express itself in motor 

 terms in response to deflnite but generally complex stimula- 



= Mind, October, 1889. 



