January 29, 1892.] 



SCIENCE. 



63 



tions of sense; i.e., they are inherited motor intuitions" (p. 

 311). Nor must it be forgotten that all these classes of 

 stimuli have meaning for the reactive consciousness because 

 they have a "feeling aspect." "An idea simply as an idea 

 — if such could be realized — might not react in movement; 

 but the simple presence of an idea in consciousness is itself 

 a feeling, and only io as far as it affects us does it move us " 

 (pp. 313-314). "Affects," therefore, is the expressive term 

 to be applied to all stimuli to involuntary movement. 



In chapter xiv., ideal feeling, in its motor aspects, is the 

 subject of discussion. Here the stimuli have a characteristic 

 wanting to those previously considered, viz., the element of 

 intention. The "end foreseen " illuminates and directs con- 

 sciousness in company with the ever-present stimulus of 

 "interest." Professor Baldwin finds that "interest in an 

 object," " emotional excitement," " idea-motor suggestion," ' 

 " ideal pleasure and pain," are the general stimuli to volun- 

 tary movement. The genetic aspect of mental life — the 

 organic connection of higher with lower ia mental develop- 

 ment — here finds illustration in the reappearance of " affects " 

 as stimuli. In lines worth quoting we are told, that "the 

 psychology which separates volition from reaction so sharply 

 as to deny any influence upon the will to other stimuli than 

 pictured ideas, is false. The conditions back of an act of 

 choice are never limited to the alternatives between which 

 the choice is made. There is beneath it all a dumb, unex- 

 pressed mass of affects — organic partially — felt tendencies 

 outwards, which give coloring to the whole process " (pp. 

 319-320). This is interesting as a preliminary warning of 

 the complexity to be met when we come to the fundamental 

 problem of choice and its conditions; for it is complexity 

 such as this which makes free-will theGordian knot of moral 

 philosophy. Analyze and elaborate what is known, as best 

 we may, and there is yet left over a residuum of unreduced 

 complexity sufficiently great to introduce a precarious ele- 

 ment into our best results. To snatch certainty out of the 

 hands of uncertainty, other considerations than those purely 

 psychological may be necessary ; it may be necessary, as in 

 Professor James's case, to adopt a belief in freedom on ethical 

 grounds. In the graphic language of James, "taking the 

 risk of error on our head, we must project upon one of the 

 alternative views the attribute of reality for us; we must so 

 fill our mind with the idea of it that it becomes our settled 

 creed." " 



Passing by the analysis of "desire," with its ethical sug- 

 gestions all along the line, we come to the author's definition 

 of "motive," as "any influence whatever which tends to 

 bring about voluntary action" (p. 332). Motives may be 

 either ends or affects, while ends alone give definite lines of 

 guidance where choice is made. 



From the exploration of the springs of voluntary activity, 

 the author passes to the nature of such activity, finding 

 that it is always characterized by a feeling of consent or 

 feeling of effort. All effort feeling is one of two kinds — 

 either positive or negative: effort to do or effort not to do. 

 Fiat of will is positive effort; neget, the negative. Three 

 factors in the development of voluntary movement are stated : 

 " (1) Voluntary attention to a presentation, which, in turn, 

 stimulates a native muscular reaction; (2) voluntary atten- 

 tion to a presentation of movement, which stimulates the 

 movement presented; (3) voluntary attention to an end for 

 which a muscular reaction is a necessary means" (pp. 343-4). 

 These come to light as a result of the analysis of the fiat and 



1 cf. James's "Psychology," Vol. II., p. 522. 



2 " Psychology," Vol. II., p. 573. 



neget into their elements; and this examination gives ground 

 for the important claim that " the entire question as to what 

 volition is, is accordingly thrown back upon an investigation 

 of the exercise of voluntary attention " ' (p. 342). 



Chapter xiii. introduces matter bearing from the very be- 

 ginning more directly on the problem of freedom; the whole 

 field is canvassed with a minuteness and comprehensiveness 

 which makes the discussion a model of what psychological 

 investigation should be. You feel at once that Professor 

 Baldwin's mental constitution has no toleration for vague 

 thinking, and that his style has a scientific sharpness about 

 it that never admits of doubtful interpretation. The chapter 

 throughout is characterized by a richness of ethical sugges- 

 tion such as one rarely meets in text-books on psychology. 

 Philosophers of Dr. Johnson's type, with their " we're free 

 and there's an end on't," would learn not a little about the 

 inner character of that freedom if they were willing to do 

 the clear thinking wliich Baldwin's book makes possible. 



Baldwin emphasizes with James ' the absurdity of a concep- 

 tion of "motives" only too common among philosophical 

 Philistines. The conflict of motives is not a conflict between 

 separate ideas with a distinct activity of their own, each ex- 

 ploding its own gun to compel submission from the others. 

 Such a conception is worse than imaginary. " A motive is 

 nothing in itself. It is only a name for a partial expression 

 of the nature of the agent. Consequently motives can in no 

 sense be considered as forces which expend their energies 

 upon the will or which fight each other " (p. 353). Again, 

 " how can they be conceived as separate entities contending 

 in a theatre which is cold stone to all of them ? Rather they 

 are all vital elements in the functional synthesis of a living 

 consciousness." 



Another essential point is emphasized, namely, that when 

 we penetrate to the inner nature of volition we find that it 

 carries with it the act of attention (p. 351). This reminds 

 one strongly of James's assertion that the real question of 

 fact in the controversy on free- will relates to the "amount 

 of effort of attention or consent" which could be given at 

 any one time.^ The role played by attention in deliberation 

 and choice is of fundamental importance. Deliberation is a 

 process of examination and comparison, — it is the search- 

 light of the mind illuminating the field of consciousness, 

 bringing clearly into view alternative or incompatible de- 

 sires," and comparing their relative degrees of desirability 

 prior to the act of choice which is the termination of the 

 process: with choice the final fiat has gone forth, deliberation 

 is at an end, and the deed is potentially done. "A resolve 

 involves all the elements of a motor flat except the word 

 'now.'"' Of the two great classes of motives, "affects" 

 and "ends" involved in deliberation and choice, superior 

 volitional worth is given to "ends." These are the more 

 objective data before the eye of deliberation. "It is only 

 by strengthening the influence of particular ends that effects 

 enter." In fact, " what actual volition is concerned with is 

 therefore ends, and ends only." If this be so, it is important 

 to learn how an end passes into volition. 



Baldwin's answer to this question is like Hodgson's." The 

 picturing of ends is a thinking process: it is an ordinary 

 apperceptive act by which new elements are taken up into 

 the old by a larger integration, the process being one of ab- 



3 ct. James's " Psychology," Vol. II., p. 561. 

 ■' " Psychology," Vol. II., p. 569. 

 s " Psychology," Vol. II., p. 571. 



« Mind, April, 1891, p. 170; "Free-Will: An Analysis," by Shadworth 

 Hodgson. 



' James, Vol. II., p. 561. 



s April number of Mind, 1891, p. 171. 



