SCIENCE 



NEW YORK, MARCH 4, 1893. 



THE NEED OF PSYCHOLOGICAL TRAINING. 



A FEW — only a few — years ago we learned psychology 

 from antiquated text-books that by tales of extraordinary 

 occurrences, quotations of poetry, emphatic assertations, oc- 

 casional proofs by the phrase '' it is evident," and a few im- 

 properly observed facts, gave a complete exposition of the 

 human mind in 500 or 600 pages — except in some cases 

 where the author was kind enough to be satisfied with half 

 that amount. To day a psychologist of that kind lectures to 

 bare benches in the universities of Germany, and the new 

 psychology has got such a hold in America that it is rapidly 

 becoming a fashion, if not a fad. 



Still, in this very fact there lies a great danger to the 

 proper development of the science. There is a tendency to 

 careless work, to rapid shuffling off of quasi-experimental 

 researches, to a neglect of the drudgery of a scientiSc inves- 

 tigation of the fundamental problems, and to a pursuit of 

 ghost stories, telepathy, and sensational hypnotic tales. 

 Even where the psychologist is really a scientific man there 

 is a tendency to rest contented with merely qualitative re- 

 sults where quantitative measurements could he made with 

 the exercise of brains and patience. 



In regard to the sensationalism and quackery that have 

 assumed the garb of psychology we can do no more than 

 every other science does in that respect, simply put the pub- 

 lic on its guard. If, as is usually the case, the public prefers 

 swindle to science; the matter is beyond our control. There 

 is also little to be said against the so-called " theoretical " or 

 "metaphysical" psychology that has blocked scientific de- 

 velopment in the past and opposes it in the present. The 

 " metaphysical " psychology is neither metaphysical nor 

 psychological ; the term is used merely to cuver up the ina- 

 bility or the dislike for careful observation and experiment, it 

 being much easier to sit at home in the study chair and spin 

 out a work on psychology than to put on the apron, clean bat- 

 teries and smoke chronograph drums in the laboratory. 



What is to be called to attention here is the fact that we 

 psychologists are not making the proper efforts toward exac- 

 titude in our experiments. In the first place it is becoming 

 too common to consider that going through any careless 

 series of manipulations is making an experiment. An ex- 

 periment is the systematic variation of the conditions gov- 

 erning a phenomenon in order to observe the results of such 

 a variation, The amount of systematic preparation required 

 and of careful observation to be exercised depends on the 

 stage of development in which the science finds itself. Any 

 lack of preparation that could have been expected, or any 

 deficiency in the necessary care, removes the pretended ex- 

 periment from the realms of science to that of dilletantism. 

 Dilletantism may he all very good as a source of amuse- 

 ment, but it must never be considered as science. As 

 Wundt has remarked, " the most dangerous enemy of psy- 

 chology to-day is not the metaphysical psychology of former 

 days, but the self-sufficient amateurism that considers every 

 aimless toying as a scientific experiment." 



Aside from this amateurism there is another deficiency, 

 perhaps of a still more important nature. In the various 

 perioi'icals we meet accounts of qualitative experiments that 

 might just as well have heen made quantitative. Of course 

 qualitative experiments are necessary as preliminary investi- 

 gations, but they are inexcusable where quantitative ones 

 can be made. That is to say, although they are necessary as- 

 forerunners of measurements, and although at certain stages 

 of investigation, they are of incalculable value, yet the sci- 

 entist must never rest satisfied with them, but should regard 

 them only as stepping-stones for further progress. I can 

 find no better way of stating this than by repeating the words 

 of Sir William Thomson: "I often say when you can 

 measure what you are speaking about, and express it in 

 numbers, you know something about it; but when you can- 

 not measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, 

 your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind; it 

 may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, 

 in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science, whatever 

 the matter may be" ("Popular Lectures and Addresses," I., 

 73, London, Macmillan, 1889). 



The first step in an investigation is a determination of the 

 relations of dependence between various phenomena; this, 

 however, must give place as soon as possible to a measure- 

 ment of the changes in the mutually related phenomena. 

 This we can already do to a great extent in regard to mental 

 processes. The degree of accuracy obtainable is in some 

 cases scarce second to that of physical determinations, but in 

 others it falls far below. 



The future of psychology, however, lies in the possibility 

 of increasing the accuracy of the measurements of mental 

 phenomena. An advance in accuracy is a difficult thing; 

 but it is of such importance that any sacrifice of time and 

 trouble is justifiable for that purpose. To reduce the error 

 of observations in a given problem by a tenth is a great task, 

 and it becomes greater with each increase in accuracy. Psy- 

 chology, however, is in the fortunate position of being in 

 possession of methods more accurate than the majority of 

 psychologists are able to apply. Wundt and his followers 

 have gone ahead so rapidly that on the one hand their re- 

 sults can claim an accuracy only one degree less than that 

 of physics, but on the other the psychologists who have 

 never had a training in his laboratory are not quite able to 

 keep up the pace. This, of course, does not apply to those 

 domains of mind not yet subject to measurement. It is very 

 true that there are still large groups of mental phenomena 

 not yet investigated by experiment; we have not yet found 

 a measure for hate, for enthusiasm, or for vertigo. There 

 are still others in regard to which we stand at present just 

 on the point of introducing experimental methods without 

 having achieved anything of great importance; such are the 

 subjects of pleasure, hallucination, the lower senses, etc. 

 Yet again we find those that are fast yielding themselves up 

 to qualitative and even quantitative analyses, e.g., volition 

 in some of its results, the sense of equilibrium, pain (dermal 

 pain quantitatively measured), smell (quantitative measure- 

 ments by Zwaardemaker and Henry), etc. Ou the other 

 hand the magnificent achievements in the domain of sight. 



