October lo, 1890.] 



SCIENCE. 



207 



BOOK-REVIEWS. 



.Elliptic Functions. By Arthur L. Baker. New York, Wiley. 

 8°. $1.50. 



Those who want to take up this somewhat complicated subject, 

 and who have been repelled by the larger works of foreign writers, 

 will be glad to get hold of Professor Baker's work, who is, by the 

 way, the professor of mathematics in the Stevens School of the 

 Stevens Institute of Technology, Hoboken, N.J., and who was 

 formerly connected with the scientific department of Lafayette 

 OoUege, Easton, Penn. 



Professor Baker does not pretend to have contributed any thing 

 to the methods of treatment, but be has aimed at smoothing the 

 road to this increasingly important branch of mathematics, and 

 •of putting within reach of the English student a tolerably com- 

 plete outline of the subject, clothed in simple mathematical lan- 

 guage and methods. 



The Principles of Psychology. By William James. 2 vols. 

 (American Science Series, Advance Course.) New York, 

 Holt. 8°. 



In the presence of two large and weighty volumes, embodying 

 the sIo>vly matured thoughts of an able and original thinker upon 

 a subject teeming with new and fascinating problems but no less 

 so with difficulties and pitfalls, the reviewer finds his task no 

 ordinary one He feels that he has before him a work destined to 

 have considerable influence upon the progress of psychological 

 science amongst us, and especially so because it appears at a time 

 in the growth of the science which is particularly i-esponsive to 

 formative influences, and because it appeajs to the advanced 

 student, who has in some part acquired the fundamental facts, 

 and is ready to form interpretations and opinions of his own, — a 

 work for which the teacher of psychology will find a handy place 

 ■on his book-shelf, and to which all those who in the future may 

 attempt surveys of psychological science will make repeated and 

 pertinent reference. 



The attitude of the author to his subject is precisely that of the 

 expert in any department of exact science to his chosen specialty. 

 It is to psychology as a science — to scientific psychology— that 

 Professor James contributes. " I have kept close to the point of 

 view of natural science throughout the book. Every natural sci- 

 ence assumes certain data uncritically, and declines to challenge 

 the elements between which its own 'laws' obtain, and from 

 ■which its own deductions are carried on. . . . This book, assum- 

 ing that thoughts and feelings exist and are vehicles of knowledge, 

 thereupon contends that Psychology, when she ha^ ascertained 

 the empirical correlation of the various sorts of thought or feeling 

 •with definite conditions of the brain, can go no farther— can go 

 no farther, that is, as a natural .science. If she goes farther, she 

 becomes metaphysical." While psychology thus demands recog- 

 nition as a distinct one of the sciences, it is equally desirous of 

 keeping in intimate relationship with every other department of 

 knowledge that can contribute to its completeness, or to which it 

 may be useful. Especially in the present stage of rapid growth 

 is it necessary to keep eyes and ears open to suggestions from any 

 source, and to refrain from any narrow though ever so systematic 

 definition of the province of psychology. Professor James's ex- 

 pression of this need, and defence of this position, are so admira- 

 ble as to demand citation. 



"The boundary-line of the mental is certainly vague. It is 

 better not to be pedantic, but to let the science be as vague as the 

 subject and include such phenomena as these, if by so doing we 

 can throw any light on the main business in hand. It will ere 

 long be seen, I trust, that we can, and that we gain much more 

 by a broad than by a narrow conception of our subject. At a 

 certain stage in the development of every science a degree of vague- 

 ness is what best consists with fertility. On the whole, few recent 

 formulas have done more real service of a rough sort in psychology 

 than the Spencerian one, that the essence of mental life and of 

 bodily life are one, namely, ' the adjustment of inner to outer 

 relations.' Such a formula is vagueness incarnate; but because it 

 takes into account the fact that minds inhabit environments, 

 which act on them, and on which they in turn re-act; because, in 



short, it takes mind in the midst of all its concrete relations, — it 

 is immensely more fertile than the old-fashioned ' rational psy- 

 chology,' which treated the soul as a detached existent, sufficient 

 unto itself, and assumed to consider only its nature and properties. 

 I shall therefore feel free to make any sallies into zoology or into 

 pure nerve-physiology which may seem instructive for our pur- 

 poses, but otherwise shall leave those sciences to the physiologists " 



While thus free to borrow from more mature sciences, psychol- 

 ogy is not less free to develop its own methods and resources. 

 Experimental psychology is not co extensive with scientific psy- 

 chology: ob.servalion, hypothesis, comparison, and that much- 

 abused introspection, have all equally worthy places. The mere 

 mental fact means about as little as any other: the interpretation 

 of it gives it life and a place in science. Such interpretation is 

 frequently impossible except by the inner consultation of personal 

 experience by introspection. The introspection that is dangerous, 

 and upon which a justifiable odium has fallen is one that soars free 

 of experience, takes no account of the peculiarities of the mind 

 that is "introspected," and ends by forcing the facts into accord 

 with a fanciful theory. The intvo.spection that Professor James 

 so cleverly employs is one that welcomes any possible corrobora- 

 tion or suggestion from experiment, —one that is made necessary 

 by the inadequacy of the facts, and has for its en'^1 the accumula- 

 tion of further knowledge. 



Having thus indicated the spirit and methods of the work, we 

 may proceed to examine its scope and subject-matter. This it is 

 difficult to describe except by enumerating the titles of chapters. 

 It is difficult to discover the guiding principle according to which 

 one topic is treated fully, a second sparingly, and a third entirely 

 ignored. Indeed, one derives the impression that this guiding 

 principle is none other than the personal Interests of the author. 

 He has gathered together the various problems of which he has at 

 various times made special study (and in part published the re- ■ 

 suits), and added thereto certain other chapters allied to these in 

 the way of introduction or corollary. It is not, and makes no 

 pretence of being, a systematic work. The topics most liberally 

 treated are such as the perception of space, perception of time, 

 perception of " things," perception of reality, the stream of 

 thought, association, attention, imagination, self-consciousness, 

 the emotions, the will, necessary truths; though the more con- 

 crete problems of the functions of the brain, habit, discrimination 

 and comparison, memory, instinct, hypnotism, are by no means 

 slighted. The order of topics is also not the usual one. First are 

 treated the complex mental operations as presented in the adult 

 thinker; and then, as analysis shows the possibility of viewing 

 these as elaborate instances of simpler abstract processes, the lat- 

 ter are more specifically studied. 



The manner of treatment is everywhere attractive, and there 

 are few dull pages in the book. There is a wealth of illustrative 

 material gathered from a great variety of sources, and the de- 

 scriptions of mental and emotional conditions are always bright 

 and pertinent. As one instance of many, take the following de- 

 scription of the state of distraction, or "brown study:" "The eyes 

 are fixed on vacancy; the sounds of the world melt into confused 

 unity ; the attention is dispersed so that the whole body is felt, as 

 it were, at once; and the foreground of consciousness is filled, if 

 by any thing, by a sort of solemn sense of surrender to the empty 

 passing of time. In the dim background of our mind we know, 

 meanwhile, what we ought to be doing: getting up, dressing our- 

 selves, answering the person who has spoken to us, trying to 

 make the next step in our reasoning. But somehow- we cannot 

 start: Vae peiisee de derriere la tete fails to pierce the shell of leth- 

 argy tKat wraps our state about. Every moment we expect the 

 spell to break, for we know no reason why it should continue. 

 But it does continue, pulse after pulse, and we float with it until 

 — also without reason that we can discover — an energy is given, 

 something — we know not what — enables us to gather ourselves 

 together, we wink our eyes, we shake our heads, the background- 

 ideas become effective, and the wheels of life go round again." 



Finally, with regard to the practical value of the work. What 

 is its place as a lexfc-hook? It certainly can hope for only a lim- 

 ited field. It takes for granted that knowledge which it is the 

 purpose of most college courses in psychology to convey; and, 



