Freedom of Will Empirically Considered, 11 



manner sounds that enter the ear are distorted in dreams 

 so as to suit the circumstances of^the dream, rather than the 

 external fact. Both of these results indicate a momentary- 

 separation between the thinking process and the organs of 

 expression and preception which accompany and sustain it. 



The hesitancy and difficulty with which the mind sometimes 

 meets in trying to recall a word seems to lie in the feeble 

 hold of the memory on the one side, and the inability of the 

 mind to guide the organs of utterance on the other. The 

 image of the written word and the sound of the word are 

 both partially present, and both fail of perfect form. Thus 

 one may have uttered yesterday a difficult sound, and have 

 lost to-day the power of repeating it. 



If we allow an exact correspondence between cerebral 

 condition and pure thought, we confound the distinction 

 between instinct and reason. Instinct is plainly character- 

 ized by a direct connection of external stimuli with appro- 

 priate actions; the transition being, however, more or less 

 protracted, and united with the ordinary variable experi- 

 ences of life. Reason, under the view now combated, would 

 be simply an extension of instinct, whereas it manifests 

 itself not only as a new combination of powers, but also as 

 one that is constantly setting instinct aside and reducing it 

 to its lowest terms. 



This theory of an exact correspondence between cerebral 

 states and rational activity makes no sufficient and no 

 plausible provision for the growth of rational powers. 

 Cerebral states and cerebral actions are not inexhaustible. 

 If a distinct combination is demanded by each distinct 

 thought, and if memory requires the preservation of these 

 combinations, the capacity of the brain w^ould be steadily 

 exhausted by its development, and we should experience in 

 reason, as we do experience in instinct, limits to mental un- 

 folding. So small a substance as the brain cannot, in its 

 molecular states, be the counterpart of the entire universe 

 in all the actual and possible relations of its parts. There 

 must be some limit to the discursus of reason if each 

 thought appropriates a definite portion of a limited power. 

 The theory is unreasonably complicated, and in that degree 



