OCTOBEB 21, 1904.] 



SCIENCE. 



515 



was recognized as its ultimate aim, the bio- 

 logical side of anthropology developed in 

 an entirely different manner. It owes its 

 origin to the great zoologists of the eight- 

 eenth century, and in conformity with the 

 general systematic tendencies of the times, 

 the main efforts were directed towards a 

 classification of the races of man and to the 

 discovery of valid characteristics by means 

 of which the races could be described as 

 varieties of one species or as distinct spe- 

 cies. The attempts at classification were 

 numerous, but no new point of view was 

 developed. 



During the nineteenth century a certain 

 approach between these two directions was 

 made, which may be exemplified by the 

 wort of Klemm. The classificatory aspect 

 was combined with the historical one and 

 the leading discussion related to the dis- 

 covery of mental differences between the 

 zoological varieties or races of men, and to 

 the question of polygenism and monoge- 

 nism. The passions that were aroused by 

 the practical and ethical aspects of the 

 slavery question did much to concentrate 

 attention on this phase of the anthropol'og- 

 ical problem. 



As stated before, most of the data of an- 

 thropology had been collected by travelers 

 whose prime object was geographical dis- 

 coveries. For this reason the collected ma- 

 terial soon demanded the attention of geog- 

 raphers, who viewed it from a new stand- 

 point. To them the relations between man 

 and nature were of prime importance and 

 their attention was directed less to psycho- 

 logical questions than to those relating to 

 the dependence of the form of culture upon 

 geographical surroundings, and the control 

 of natural conditions gained by man with 

 the advance of civilization. 



Thus we find about the middle of the 

 nineteenth century the beginnings of an- 

 thropology laid from three distinct points 

 of view: the historical, the classificatory 



and the geographical. About this time 

 the historical aspect of the phenomena of 

 nature took hold of the minds of investiga- 

 tors in the whole domain of science. Be- 

 ginning with biology, and principally 

 through Darwin's powerful influence, it 

 gradually revolutionized the whole method 

 of natural and mental science and led to a 

 new formulation of their problems. The 

 idea that the phenomena of the present 

 have developed from previous forms with 

 which they are genetically connected and 

 which determine them, shook the founda- 

 tions of the old principles of classification 

 and knit together groups of facts that hith- 

 erto had seemed disconnected. Once 

 clearly enunciated, the historical view of 

 the natural sciences proved irresistible and 

 the old problems faded away before the 

 new attempts to discover the history of evo- 

 lution. From the very beginning there has 

 been a strong tendency to combine with the 

 historical aspect a subjective valuation of 

 the various phases of development, the 

 present serving as a standard of compari- 

 son. The oft-observed change from simple 

 forms to more complex forms, from uni-, 

 formity to diversity, was interpreted as a 

 change from the less valuable to the more 

 valuable and thus the historical view as- 

 sumed in many cases an ill-concealed teleo- 

 logical tinge. The grand picture of nature 

 in which for the first time the universe ap- 

 pears as a unit of ever-changing form and 

 color, each momentary aspect being deter- 

 mined by the past moment and determining 

 the coming changes, is still obscured by a 

 subjective element, emotional in its sources, 

 which leads us to ascribe the highest value 

 to that which is near and dear to us. 



The new historical view also came into 

 conflict with the generalizing method of 

 science. It was imposed upon that older 

 view of nature in which the discovery of 

 general laws was considered the ultimate 

 aim of investigation. According to this 



